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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1983



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CPCZ WEEKLY EVALUATES WEST'S REACTION TO POLAND

Prague TVORBA in Czech No 2, 13 Jan 82 p 6

[Article by Bohumil Brejzek: "The West and the Polish Events"]

[Text] The declaration of martial law in the Polish Peoples Republic [PLR] naturally aroused extraordinary attention and response around the world. The fraternal socialist countries view the development in Poland as a purely internal affair of this country, they support the efforts of the Military Council of national salvation to consolidate the situation and to strengthen socialism. The socialist countries are also organizing effective aid. In addition to deliveries of raw materials and oil, the Soviet Union is also assisting in the problems of food supply. Our republic too is helping in delivering consumer goods and foodstuffs to the PLR. At the same time, a campaign is being organized in individual krajs and okreses aimed at aid to Polish children. A positive attitude to the events in Poland has also been adopted by most of the communist and workers parties around the world, even though some of them--as, for example, the Italian and Spanish--assess the events without consideration of their class aspect or the counterrevolutionary peril.

The Polish counterrevolutionary forces have received full support of the anticommunist and reactionary circles in the West, headed by American imperialism. As soon as the decisive struggle in the defense of socialism began in Poland, the United States halted the promised assistance in foodstuffs and unleashed a provocative campaign against people's Poland and its government.

On the other hand, the imperialist circles have tried and still try to exploit the very crisis which, to a considerable measure, came about and grew under the influence of their subversive operations against the PLR. For this purpose, they mobilized every means--the propaganda apparatus, economic, political, diplomatic and other levers and various types of support of the antisocialist elements in that country. They were led to this by the sole desire to blacken and discredit socialism, both in theory and practice, as a world system, dismantle the socialist system in Poland and later in the other fraternal countries, negate the successes of people's power, subvert the Polish alliance with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and alter the balance of forces in Europe and around the globe in favor of imperialism.

The activity of external counterrevolutionary forces striving for destabilization of the situation and disruption of the socialist system in Poland, has its own early history. This subversive activity is part of a long-term policy of the imperialist

powers aimed against the socialist states. First it was the Truman Doctrine, followed by a most varied string of concepts proclaimed to "contain," "repel," "erode," communism, to defend "human rights," and the current policy of the Reagan government which, through the concept of multifaceted, steadily sharpening confrontation with the Soviet Union and the whole socialist world, strives to achieve global military superiority of the United States, and proclaims that "limited nuclear conflicts" are permissible. The strategy of the anticommunist and anti-Soviet forces has been in effect ever since the birth of the first socialist country in the world. While the concepts, tactics, forms and methods of subversive activity have been varied, the ultimate objective remains the same. It is to subvert the unity and solidarity of the fraternal countries by a so-called differentiated approach to them, which culminated ideologically and politically in the 1960s and 1970s by the incitement of nationalist and petty bourgeois moods, with the help of which the West aimed to erode the social and state structure in the socialist countries. The imperialist circles engaged in unceasing economic intervention against them and plotted diversionary schemes against socialism, its ideals and the socialist way of life. From this vantage point, it is easier to explain the rising hysteria and hostile policy of the West, proclaimed and enforced by the United States.

The response of the Western states to the December events in Poland, developed under severe pressures on these states by the United States. The first reaction of the West German Government was prompted by a policy of noninterference. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt felt it important that the crisis remain under control and that Poland settle its problems on its own. The position of the French Government, despite the initial statement by Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, to the effect that the Polish events were an internal matter, underwent a change when President Francois Mitterrand issued a directive that the government "must express its displeasure," in order to go along with Washington's desire to create a situation conducive to an escalation of interference in the affairs of the P.R. Continuation of this approach was marked by a special session of the Socialist International, convoked on 29 December in Paris by the French Socialist Party which, for all practical purposes, had only one point on its agenda, namely, taking a position on the events in Poland. In the proclamation issued at the close of the meeting, without the participation of Chairman Willy Brandt, who is a proponent of noninterference in Polish affairs, there is criticism of the lawful Polish Government, a demand for the continuation of dialogue with the so-called Solidarity and other steps attesting to interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

The climax of the anti-Polish and anticommunist Western campaign which is emerging in spite of the relatively realistic approach of a number of West European politicians, is the course of the United States which clearly demonstrates what the self-proclaimed defenders of human rights were really after in Poland. The immediate scrapping of food assistance to Poland and the recall of fishing rights to Polish ships in American waters were only the beginning of the hysteria which followed the fiasco suffered in Poland by imperialist interventionists. A further escalation of this campaign were the "sanctions" against the USSR imposed on 29 December of last year. Aeroflot flights to the United States were suspended indefinitely, the Soviet purchasing office was closed, issuance and renewal of export permits to the Soviet Union for electrotechnical and other technological equipment were stopped, and several of other discriminatory measures were announced, and their recall was conditioned by the American president on a change in the current course in Poland.

Ronald Reagan was seconded by U. S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who declared that the U.S. Government expected that the other states would also participate in the sanctions against the Soviet Union.

An emergency session of foreign ministers of the 10 EEC countries was marked by heavy U.S. pressure, and dealt exclusively with the intervention in the internal affairs of the PLR. While the 10 West European leaders declared, on the one hand, that they did not intend to participate in economic "sanctions" initiated by the United States against the Soviet Union and Poland, they nevertheless voiced so many objections to the policy of the Polish Government and so many conditions for the continuance of the present economic cooperation with the PLR and USSR that they left the door open for possible submission to a Washington dictate.

Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki, in a personal letter to the American president, wrote that he is convinced that the Poles would handle the situation on their own. Moreover, he stated that Japan would grant Poland the promised aid in foodstuffs and a financial loan. A reserved stance on the sanctions was also assumed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Thus, the discriminatory measures instituted by the American president and other steps undertaken by his administration, have not resulted in the kind of response from America's allies that Washington hoped for. As stated in a TASS dispatch, the recent American measures represent "another White House attempt to use the long-discredited method of threats and extortion, which must therefore be regarded as a determined effort of the U.S. ruling circles to exacerbate the international atmosphere, return to the dark days of the cold war, and give U.S. imperialism a free hand to conduct a militarist policy aimed at attaining supremacy over the whole world."

On the first day of this year, the Soviet paper PRAVDA published an article by Academician Georgy Arbatov, entitled "Washington Strives for Crisis." The article notes especially the attempts to "internationalize" the crisis and to exploit events concerned with internal PLR affairs toward even greater deterioration in the international situation including, among other things, relations with the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan in his speech brazenly ascribes "responsibility" for martial law in Poland to the Soviet Union, an argument meant to justify the "sanctions." The aim of the effort to "internationalize" the Polish problem is quite clear, namely, to draw the allies together and to make enough noise around Poland to cover up serious disagreements among them, emanating from very serious problems of security, foreign policy and economics. At the same time, this effort is designed to put a brake on the growth of the powerful antinuclear and antiwar movement in Europe. As noted by Academician Arbatov, official America is again ignoring the realities of our era.

9496

CSO: 2400/130

PRESS CONFERENCE ON CIA SUBVERSION HELD

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 29 Jan 82 pp 1, 4

[Article by Ludwik Arendt and Piotr Moczar: "CIA Subversion in Poland"]

[Text] The latest conference held on January 28 at the ministry of Foreign Affairs press center began in an unusual fashion. Those attending were shown several films assembled from material in the Ministry of Internal Affairs files illustrating espionage activities conducted on Poland's territory by U.S. special services. One of the films, shown on Polish television last Wednesday, presented the profile of Leslie Sternberg, 30, third secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, exposed as a CIA agent.

In recent years, this was not the only instance of revealing the double role performed by American diplomats accredited to Poland. This fact was referred to in another film on Peter Berg [Burke], second secretary in the political section of U.S. Embassy in Warsaw who had been operating in Poland since May 1979. He specialized in collecting information on communications in the National Air Defense Forces, organization of the chain of command and its improvement on different levels and the structure of OTK [Domestic Territorial Defense Forces].

Another film presented the contacts of another American diplomat Michael G. Anderson with KSS KOR [Special-Self-Defense Committee] activists, including Zbigniew Romaszewski. The American whose name is on the list of diplomats accredited in Warsaw, pledged, among other things, to communicate an analysis of the current situation and development prospects in Poland, authored by KOR, to the participants of the Madrid conference. As can be concluded from the film, plans had also been made to arrange, with the backing of U.S. Embassy, a demonstration of solidarity for American diplomats imprisoned in Tehran.

U.S. intelligence service has also recruited Polish citizens, chiefly those temporarily employed abroad, as seen in the films presenting the activities of Zenon Celegrat, a Polish radio operator for the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam in 1974-76, and the profile and CIA links of Alicja Wesolowska formerly an administrative worker at the United Nations.

These and other facts were additionally illustrated by a conference hall exhibit of authentic communications devices currently used by CIA agencies, photographic documentation, albums featuring arrested agents and materials seized at Leslie Sternberg's.

Information on diverse aspects of intelligence and subversive activities conducted by U.S. special services was provided to the newsmen by Col Zbigniew Wislocki, representing Polish counterintelligence, Col Hipolit Staszak, director of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Investigation Bureau and Col Boleslaw Klis, department head in the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office.

The exhibited films and documents, Col Wislocki said, exemplified cases of espionage, quite common in recent years, exposed by Polish counterintelligence. Those examples were typical. He added that the range of activities of American special services was very extensive. Evidence for the implementation of far reaching plans concerning Poland included contacts of high-ranking U.S. Embassy officials in Warsaw with Leszek Moczulski, leader and founder of KPN [Confederacy of Independent Poland].

The importance of KPN activities within Poland for American intelligence is evidenced by the arrival of an expert on political destabilization specializing in Polish affairs to Warsaw to take part in a meeting with Moczulski.

Exploiting Poland's difficult and complex sociopolitical situation, U.S. special forces played an essential role in the establishment of structures for oppositionary and antistate organizations by providing assistance in the form of equipment, funds and political and moral support. In the main, printing and audio-video equipment was supplied. Aid was also provided in establishing permanent contact and collaboration with hostile centers abroad. Such collaboration did not always assume the form of an agent network. In all, cases, however, special forces were involved in it. As contacts with oppositionary activists were becoming closer, attempts were made to acquire information of purely espionage nature.

Col Wislocki also gave information on a system for financing espionage activities in Poland. Special funds, scholarly or cultural, enterprises and similar ventures are created for that purpose. Their goals, in many cases highly respectable, in essence are a screen for financing subversive activities. An example of that is the Polish Cultural Foundation, established in Australia, last year, that awards stipends to persons who declare their willingness for anti-Polish activity.

In the recent period, some legally operating organizations in Poland received many gifts, from abroad, in many cases valuable. Their nature as well as the profiles of the 'donors' could not fail to alarm the Polish counterintelligence. Intense interest of U.S. intelligence services in the situation in Poland, along with their actions to the detriment of our country's interests, Col Wislocki asserted, date back to 1945. The level of intensity has always been proportionate to internal situation in Poland and international outlook. In the last 2 to 3 years, however, we have to deal with unprecedented intensity in classic espionage, relying among other things on stepped-up recruitment of Polish citizens both for the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Most often, attempts are made to recruit Polish diplomats, journalists, scholars, businessmen and tourists. In the recent period, much attention is being focussed on enlisting administration workers, particularly those in the economic administration.

In an overwhelming majority of cases, Polish citizens report attempts of inducement for collaboration to their superiors or to counterintelligence officers. American intelligence recruitment is practically global, conducted in nearly every country and continent of the world. Polish citizens are persuaded to collaborate by American intelligence officers employed at U.S. diplomatic posts.

While providing information about them, the Polish officer presented the profiles of several staff CIA employees of many years standing. It turns out that CIA officers interested chiefly in Polish affairs are secretaries of American embassies in Stockholm, Cologne, Mexico, Tokyo and Katmandu, as well as others.

A Polish diplomat in Mexico was offered \$50,000 as a one-time payment for starting to collaborate with American intelligence. Another was promised to be retained in diplomatic service after the seizure of power in Poland by "Solidarity." The CIA resident in Stockholm concentrates on establishing contact with Polish tourists arriving to Ystad by ferry.

Subsequently, the guests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press centers responded to newsmen's questions.

A representative of the American television NBC was curious why a conference on this topic was organized precisely at the time. Until now--the response ran--we have been charged with talking a lot about subversion and espionage without revealing specific facts, evidence and mechanisms of operation of foreign intelligence services. In our opinion, therefore, there was a need for arranging a conference of this kind.

A representative of the "Los Angeles Times" was informed that more than a dozen persons, chiefly Polish citizens, are currently serving sentences for spying.

According to you, a Swedish reporter asked, how many intelligence officers are there among the Western diplomats accredited in Poland? The Polish counterintelligence is of the opinion that quite a few Western diplomats are working for intelligence services, she was told in response.

Answering a question by a GDR journalist, Col Wislocki said that the imposition of martial law largely paralyzed the activities of U.S. special services on Polish territory. It will undoubtedly be continued; certain attempts are even now being made. We are prepared for that and we will resolutely counter them, however.

One of the questions referred to the case of Bogdan Walewski, formerly an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrested under charges of espionage for the CIA, as recently reported in the Polish press. A representative of the Military Prosecutor's Office reported that the matter had been transmitted to a military court to be examined in a few days.

Walewski's activity was comprehensive. Conducted for many years, it encompassed all areas of our country's life. A reporter from the "Washington Post" also asked to what extent "Solidarity's" 'recent' success [garbled; "success?"] resulted from that organization's benefitting from the aid of U.S. special services.

"Solidarity" has had mixed success, Col Wislocki said, but its most recent achievements are regarded by us as success of the extremists, due for the most part to the activities of U.S. special services. I am referring here to those 'achievements' which had brought Poland to the brink of self-destruction and anarchy.

In response to another question posed by a correspondent of the LE FIGARO, the representative of Polish counterintelligence stated that Western diplomats accredited in Poland enjoy complete freedom of communication with Polish citizens. In Poland

he said, contact between our citizens and representatives of foreign countries has for many years now been totally unrestricted. You should know it best, having worked for many years in our country. All diplomatic posts have always been open for anyone to enter and leave without being questioned by the authorities. It is not our desire to create an espionage paranoia in Poland because it is the greatest enemy to thoroughly conducted counterintelligence operations. According to our information, however, some forms of contact are transformed into attempts at recruitment.

Responding to a Tass journalist, Col Wislocki said that no positions for contacts with "Solidarity" had been formally established in the Western embassies in Warsaw. At the U.S. Embassy, however, several employees were tasked with maintaining relations with "Solidarity" leadership groups both on the regional and central levels.

One of the last questions, posed by a Polish television reporter, concerned the motives that guide citizens of our country who engage in collaboration with foreign intelligence services.

The answer was that in the last decade or so this was no longer determined by motives of political or ideological nature. In most cases, people agree to collaborate because they count on making easy money and living comfortably. Some of those who start working for foreign intelligence services are persons experiencing difficult moments in their lives, periods of weakness and are in fear of blackmail. All are convinced about the impunity of their actions and this belief is reinforced by foreign intelligence officers who claim that "high technology" insures them from a "mis-hap."

In the course of the press conference, references were made to the approaching Madrid meeting of representatives of the states-signatories of the CSCE Final Act. It was pointed out that for some time now in the West, including the United States, an anti-Polish campaign is observed along with attempts at what is termed internationalization of the matter of our country in order to exploit the meeting against Poland. Intelligence services were collecting material on Poland thanks to KOR, among others, and activities of that organization were planned so as to permit their potential use in the course of the Madrid conference.

8795

C80: 2600/306

NZS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES CRITICIZED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 31 Dec 81-1 Jan 82 p 5

[Article by Zenon Skusa: "A Denial of One's Own Statute--Because of Course Student Problems Were Not Involved"]

[Text] This is the second example in practice in recent months when the program goals in a statute meant nothing--or practically nothing. That is how it was with Solidarity and that is how it was with the Independent Association of Students (NZS).

Let us recall:

"The goal of the association [we read in the NZS statute] is 1) action for the purpose of strengthening democracy in the academic community as well as the defense of democratic freedoms and citizen rights; 2) protection of the material, social and cultural interests of students and student families; 3) action on behalf of the subjectivity of a human being, tolerance and high moral level; 4) development of self-government and the autonomy of higher schools."

We read further in the statute that the association realizes its goals, among others, by helping and intervening in case of a violation, when a student's or group of students' rights are threatened; initiating, supporting and conducting educational and cultural activity, as well as help in organizing independent study groups and seminars; conducting studies of an economic and social nature on the material level of student life; organizing student self-help; undertaking action to develop sports, tourism and recreation among students.

The goals defined in the statute, as well as the methods for their realization do not arouse any basic doubts. However, problems do arise when the organization's everyday practice is confronted with the statute's provisions. The NZS's practice swerved from the statute more and more frequently and in many cases was in glaring conflict with it.

From the moment of its birth, the NZS was not a union organization representing its group. Despite initial declarations, its leadership imposed the profile of a political organization on the NZS, with activity extending beyond the academic community.

Almost from the moment of its registration, the NZS initiated and conducted political activity, frequently of a clearly provocative nature. NZS-organized seminars on selected facts from recent history, poster exhibits, photographs, and illegal publications had a clearly provocative character. So did wide-scale distribution of illegally published materials, emblems and brochures whose contents were aimed at the principles of government, lawful, constitutional order and even our international alliances. The leadership role of the party is questioned in many of these publications.

This kind of direction and character of activity was pressed on the association, and done so very effectively, by members of leading groups, both central and community, under the overpowering ideological influence of the Committee for Social Self-Defense [KSS] KOR, and the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), which hoped to convert the NZS into an antiparty organization.

Acceptance in practice of such an organizational character was far-reaching in consequences. It signified the shunting aside of student groups' basic problems around which the NZS's activity should have concentrated; that is, the course of studies, the instruction system, the problem of student socio-material conditions, the future of an alumnus of a higher school, the student cultural movement--in brief, everything that ought to constitute the sphere of a union organization's activity.

With few exceptions, almost all forms and methods of action were subordinated to the political program and the needs of immediate political warfare. The NZS management worked to have the association become a large and vocal organization as quickly as possible. To that end, it initiated many spectacular actions to turn the academic community's attention to itself and particularly to create a mythology for the NZS that it was the sole spokesman for the academic community's dialog with the authorities and the chief promoter of the struggle for the right of the school to autonomy and self-government. It recognized that the infallible method leading to this goal is the strike and protest marches. Thus, for any reason whatever, and frequently without any reason, it stirred up NZS students, particularly younger students', to strike action.

That happened in December 1980 and April 1981, when a wave of strikes overwhelmed many Polish schools. The pretext in December 1980 was the alleged unwillingness of the ministry to register the association, while in April 1981, it was the unwilling--according to NZS management--attitude of the authorities to the problem of school autonomy and self-government. In November and December 1981, there was the local incident in the Higher School of Engineering in Radom, whose significance essentially was not understood by many striking students. Many schools were converted into a place of "experiencing an adolescent adventure."

As a rule, each strike action was accompanied by a great wave of propaganda and given wide publicity in order to gain the support of other vocational groups, particularly the academic community. The negative effects on the progress of studies were of no consequence.

Basically, all strike actions organized by the NZS violated the principles of democracy, principles that allegedly were ardently endorsed and advocated by the

leadership and entire organization. In organizing its activity, the NZS even ruled out its own principles to the effect that "the proclamation of a strike of occupation will be approved by a majority of students...in agreement with school authorities...." In practice, a militant minority imposed its will on the majority. Pressure on the undecided was by no means confined to the psychological type.

After a year of such activity, it must be asked: What are NZS's contributions to the organization of life in higher schools? The NZS was an independent organization in the full sense of that word, because it was even independent of its own statute and the principles and operating standards set by it. It did not resolve problems for whose solution it was created. It wished to attribute to itself, and made claims for, contributions in which it did not participate, including those of school autonomy and self-government allegedly won by it.

A real and unquestioned contribution of the NZS is primarily the organization of local and all-Polish strikes, various types of protest marches, right rallies, the organization of provocative seminars and exhibits, disorganization of life in higher schools, strengthening tensions, evoking conflicts among students, disintegration of the academic community and destruction of the academic work atmosphere on behalf of politicizing activity of a clearly oppositional character.

In consequence of the imposition of a martial law, NZS's activity was suspended. However, the most aggressive activists indicated that they cannot accept this. Hence, successive efforts of various types have been undertaken at some school locations, violating existing law. Some activists endeavor to play at the role of conspirators. They call for "passive resistance" to authority. They state presumptuously that "the time for deeds is yet to come. What time do they have in mind? What and who are they counting on?

Let us raise one more question: Should precisely such an organization assemble even a part of youth in a socialist state?

10433

CSO: 2600/205

FUNCTIONS OF VOIVODSHIP DEFENSE COMMITTEES DISCUSSED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 2, 3 Jan 82 p 4

[Interview with Col Zdzislaw Malina, deputy chief of the National Defense Committee Secretariat, by Andrzej Dzierzanowski; date and place not given]

[Text] The essential factor in stabilizing the situation in the country under the prevailing circumstances--during martial law--is, above all, the honest effort of working people. Daily work by the authorities and the state administration likewise facilitates stabilization. All of these activities, in order to bring about the desired effects, must be coordinated. In the voivodships this role of coordinator is played by the Voivodship Defense Committees. We are speaking about their tasks and activities with the deputy chief of the National Defense Committee Secretariat, Col (academy graduate) Zdzislaw Malina.

[Col Malina] Voivodship Defense Committees are, on the whole, little known by the broad circle of society, even though everyone must have heard of the decisions made by them. These committees were formed in accordance with the November 1967 law of universal obligation for the defense of the PRL [Polish People's Republic]. The National Defense Committee defines their structure, function and composition. Speaking in general, the WKO [Voivodship Defense Committees] control broadly understood matters of defense in the voivodships. In peacetime they accomplish tasks in regard to defensive preparations. The specific nature of the present period--of martial law--is also included in this.

At the moment, the committees discharge the managerial duties as regards to regional organs of state administration and coordinate simultaneously the work of industrial plants, enterprises, state institutions, cooperatives and civic organizations in the way of defense matters in the voivodships. The point of the matter is the harmonious linking of the defense needs of the state with all socio-economic operations and national tasks.

[Question] With what did the Voivodship Defense Committees immediately concern themselves after the introduction of martial law by Council of State?

[Answer] Above all, they fulfilled the role of organizer. Responsibility for mobilization of regional operations by organs of the state administration as well as ministerial and regional organizational units was placed upon them,

including responsibility for the organization of the citizens' life under the specific circumstances of martial law.

For example, on the morning of December 13, the chairmen of the committees at the time of the working sessions made the decisions and the indispensable determinations related to the implementation of provisions of the decree as well as the pertinent directives enacted in virtue of it. Matters related to this were discussed during participation of all interested representatives of organs and administrations of voivodship institutions.

Martial law resulted in the fact that the life of rural and urban residents and the work in manufacturing plants and institutions were subjected to the sharp rigors of the law that were unexpected and, as a rule, insufficiently understood. This required some time to "familiarize oneself" with the arising situation. One had to expect, and life confirmed this, a lack of acquaintance with many matters, and sometimes outright incompetence in behavior and action under the circumstances of martial law. The Voivodship Defense Committees took these facts into consideration, although not all to a sufficient degree. A good example is the voivodship of Bialystok, in which appropriate training for the leading cadres was quickly organized.

The first activities of the committees boiled down to this: to do everything that is possible and indispensable for the assurance of law and order, the supplying of essential human needs, the functioning of the administration and the maintenance of continuity of production. They simultaneously endeavor to make society aware that the point of martial law is aimed at the forces destroying the country. On the other hand, the inconveniences and disciplinary rigors linked to this state and imposed upon upright citizens are, unfortunately, indispensable in the name of the higher necessity of the defending national and state interests, as well as the constant aspiration for the restoration of socio-economic life by way of socialist renewal in Poland.

In the voivodships, in which decisions were made in due course and in an efficient manner, their execution was controlled and ensured by competent information--the introduction of provisions related to martial law proceeded without any social and economic conflicts. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of leadership functions, under the difficult circumstances of martial law by some voivodship organs were very quickly made known.

Taking into consideration the recommendations of higher authorities, the voivodship defense committees made the requirements regarding the rules of individual management and responsibility of governors, mayors, directors and managers of places of employment more stringent. As a result, it was necessary to dismiss some individuals from their posts. Among them were also found those who, under normal circumstances worked ably but, unfortunately, did not cope with the new task arising from the specific nature of martial law. In the course of the first week, 90 persons, among others, in 34 voivodships--5 governors, 2 vice-governors, 2 mayors of towns and 81 directors of towns and gmina [parishes]--were dismissed.

[Question] Who belongs to the Voivodship Defense Committees?

[Answer] These are organs that act collectively and are made up of persons who occupy leadership positions in the voivodships. They are made up of the governor, vice-governors, secretaries of the committees of voivodship parties, commander of the voivodship MO [Citizens' Militia] as well as the chief of the Voivodship Military Headquarters. The latter persons serve the function of one of the deputies for the chairman of the Voivodship Defense Committees. Under the circumstances of martial law this is of critical importance for the normal assurance of the needs of the armed forces, as well as the defense aspects existing in the infrastructure of the voivodships. The central matter is the continuity of transportation operations, communications and power systems, as well as the defense industry. Plenipotentiaries of the National Defense Committee in the voivodships take part in the meetings of the committees, as well as representatives of the central and voivodship authorities, if such a need occurs.

[Question] What kind of role, in relation to the voivodship national defense committees, do the military plenipotentiaries-commissioners of the KOK [National Defense Committee] who are operating in the voivodships, play?

[Answer] Under the conditions of martial law, the military commissioners are empowered to control directly the operations of the committees as well as the regional organs of the state administration in matters related to a situation threatening the security and defenses of the state. They may also, as the needs arise, determine in this regard additional tasks for the committees and regional organs of the administration. They should see to it that the decisions undertaken by the committees are in harmony with the determinations of the chief organs of the authorities, the Military Council of National Salvation and the National Defense Committee.

The Voivodship Defense Committees pass resolutions, give instructions and recommendations. They are authorized to settle matters promptly and to issue decisions relating to activities of the regional organs of the state administration, national units, cooperatives and social organizations during martial law. They should evaluate their operations and the work of the chiefs, demand the required information, determine the lengthy tasks as well as systematically control the implementation of all measures linked to the institution of martial law regulations and the functioning of socio-economic life.

The chairmen of the committees have the right to issue orders and, when necessary, to act at once--to make appropriate decisions. In regard to defense matters, they coordinate joint action and cooperation of regional organs of the state administration with the appropriate territorial military organs.

At present, the committees concentrate their attention on assuring security in the voivodships and the maintenance of work discipline. They also coordinate the safeguarding of state buildings and quarters as well as important facilities and installations of the national economy. The essential task is maintenance of the continuity of work in industrial plants, transportation and municipal services, and also the supplying of the population with essential articles of food and primary needs as well as the efficient operation of public health services. The activities of the committees also include assurance of the operation of mass media as well as the prevention of their exploitation of objectives inconsistent with the public interest. The committees examine and determine various measures resulting from the emergency needs in the voivodships.

This shows that the main effort of the voivodship defense committees is the stabilizing, under martial law conditions, of the socio-political and economic situations in regions included in the radius of their operations. One must realize that a gradual lifting of the state of martial law and its repeal on the level of the voivodship, the region, or the entire country depends entirely on the stabilization of socio-economic life.

It is difficult at this moment to resist the statement that much depends here not only on the energetic and effective operations of the state authorities, including obviously the Voivodship National Defense Committees, but also on all citizens. Everyone, through their own attitude--in daily life, at home, at work, on duty, in every position--should have their own part in a quick normalization of the situation in the country and in the repeal of those restrictions and state of martial law which are related to martial law.

9891

CSO: 2600/225

PRZEMYSŁ VOIVODSHIP PARTY ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Deliberations of Executive Committee

Rzeszow NOWINY in Polish 10 Nov 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] At its session yesterday, the KW [voivodship committee] Executive Boards in Przemysl acquainted themselves with how the preparations for introducing economic reform in enterprises and units in the voivodship have been proceeding. The basis for their assessments and conclusions was provided by information on this subject from the vice-voivodes of Przemysl in a report produced by the Economic and Agriculture Sections and the Voivodship Committee's Food Administration based on inspection of 16 selected enterprises and economic units. Moreover, information and opinions were directly transmitted to the executive boards by representatives of management collectives from several plants.

As stated, commissions dealing with economic reform have been operating in almost all units. They have already completed a number of analytical organizational operations for the transition to the new management system, expressed in the formula "3S" [self-dependence, self-government, self-financing].

In the majority of the plants, preparatory operations for the introduction of reform are only in the initial stage. In this same stage, preparations are under way for electing self-governing work forces in enterprises.

The cause for concern may be in part represented in the faint interest in future reform shown by work forces in general and by those people directly involved in production in particular. There is need for developing effective training-informational activities to make all the work forces aware of the intentions, goals, and principles of economic reform. An information center will play an important role in seeing that this is done. Such an information center will be called for at the Voivodship Committee of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party].

In the course of discussions during yesterday's deliberations of the KW Executive Boards in Przemysl, a general demand was evidenced for speeding legislative work for initiating reform. This partially concerns regulating new tax rates, prices, margins of profits, tariffs, lists of obligated associations and the like. An absence of decisions regarding prices to take effect next year and an absence of executory rules in financial management are acknowledged as the essential factors in delaying preparatory operations in general for introducing

new principles of economic reform in the coming year. A lot of doubts, obscure points, and fears pervade the working collectives and also bear on the mechanisms of supplying raw material and foreign exchange funds.

In stressing the importance of the present stage of preparations for getting the reform really under way at the beginning of 1982, the Executive Boards of the KW stated, in part, that the problem with preparation for introducing economic reform and creating workers' self-government must occupy, beginning now, more prominent places in all of the operations and activities of party echelons and organizations. The KW Executive Boards will concern themselves on a regular basis with analyzing the degree to which economic reform is being instituted, particularly in its social aspects. It has been recommended that a system for exchanging information between plant echelons and party organizations be created for the express purpose of addressing the problems of economic reform and workers' self-government. From among the particular motions at yesterday's executive boards session, one can also mention the motion on speeding the work on calling forth an association of state agricultural enterprises that, along with small manufacturers, have already begun economic reform.

During yesterday's deliberations, KW Executive Boards of the KW PZPR in Przemyśl also reviewed the current social-political and economic situation in the voivodship. Moreover, preparation for the next session of the plenary voivodship party echelons was discussed.

Przemyśl PZPR Plenum Deliberations

Rzeszów NOWINY in Polish 13, 14, 15 Nov 81 pp 1, 2

[Article by M. Nyczek and W. Burzminski: "KW PZPR Voivodship Committee of the Polish United Workers Party Plenum: More Determination and Consistency in Activities--The Acceptance of the Voivodship Party Organization to 1983"]

[Text] During deliberations in June 1981, the Fourth Voivodship Election Conference of the PZPR in Przemyśl put the newly elected committee under the obligation of working out a program of action for the voivodship party organization covering the current term (to 1983). After wide-ranging consultation in the KW problems commission, during the regional meetings with delegates at the conference, as well as with participating party organizations of the majority of plants, the draft of this program was discussed and ratified on 12 November 1981, at the plenary session of the KW PZPR in Przemyśl. A significant part of the deliberations was devoted to discussing current problems in party work after the fourth and fifth plenums of the KC Communist Party PZPR. The plenum's agenda also included an examination of internal party matters.

In addition to members and deputy members of voivodship party echelons, members of the presidium of WKR [District Military Headquarters] and the WKKP [Voivodship Party Control Committee], first secretaries of KM [City Committee], KM/G [City/Gmina Committee] and KG [Gmina Committee] and KZ [Plant Committee] of the PZPR and the directors of most of the enterprises, plants and institutions, the deputy member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the KC PZPR, Włodzisław Mokrzyszczak, also took part in the deliberations.

First secretary of the KW PZPR, Zenon Czech, who had led the deliberations of the fourth plenum in Przemyśl, presented the executive boards' report on the current tasks in party work resulting from the last plenary sessions. As stated in the report, the position of the central committee on questions presently most important to the party, expressed in a resolution passed at the fourth plenum, came alive among the ranks of the voivodship party organization. On the basis of this resolution, a detailed plan of action was worked out, addressed to all echelons and organizations. An extensive plan for action was fully developed at both voivodship and local levels. In the majority of POPs [Primary Party Organization] and OOPs [District Party Organization], meetings were held in which tasks from these enactments were accepted. Conferences of the *aktiv* and meetings of members of the KW directorate and its permanent apparatus with work forces of factories and enterprises were also devoted to the set of problems contained in the resolution. An important element in this dialogue is the collective analysis of the possibilities for solving the most pressing problems by joint action--in the spirit of socialistic renewal--of the party, trade unions, and administration.

A striving for understanding and cooperation--emphasized in the report--must take hold in factories and farms as soon as possible, and the inspirer of these actions must be, without exception, all elements of the party. To achieve understanding, it is necessary to unite the most divergent spheres of society, all the working people in the city and in the village. It is high time that new conflicts are not allowed to arise and that controversial problems are not exacerbated but solved through work and action.

Determination and consistency in the action of all party elements are essential. Internal party discipline and at the same time party attitudes of all its membership are the requirements for strength in party ranks. Meanwhile--the report states--some party echelons in the voivodship still do not attend their own plenary meeting, do not maintain constant contact with party organizations and, thus, do not inspire their membership to work. Precisely in these environments are found the most complaints of tardiness in actions by the authorities; the party *aktiv* is not working and a feeling of helplessness seizes some comrades. In some organizations there is observed a condition that expects inspiration exclusively from without, directives from the top and some kind of ready-made recipe for solving problems with the spheres of their own competencies. Initiative and independence in undertaking decisions have a special value now.

The KW Executive Boards in their report also pointed out serious defects in state and economic administrative function at all levels in the Przemyśl Voivodship. This is manifested in tardiness, bungling and general incompetence among some people in responsible positions. Examples of tardiness have been cited; these concern, among other things, the procedure for solving a problem at the local base for the ambulance service in Przemyśl, the running of the rationing system and the distribution of goods, the lack of proper coordination of actions for solving the impasse in housing construction. On the other hand, the present activity of Local Operational Groups (TGO) has been positively appraised; and society has greatly approved of it.

Moreover, the report expresses the unrest and fear aroused by a clear breakdown in discipline in many plants. This unrest validates the current condition in the voivodship's economy. Marian Domaradzki, secretary of the KW PZPR, presented a picture of that economy in his speech at the plenum. In a 10-month period this year, the value of sales from collectivized industry fell by 12.7 percent in relation to a similar period last year (while, at the same time, people's incomes are 33 percent higher); the purchase of agricultural products (especially livestock) was 37 percent lower (in October up to 60 percent lower); in housing construction, only 457 units were commissioned, or 329 fewer units than in a 10-month period last year.

The main part of the KW secretary's speech detailed the motives, intentions and directions of the draft of the voivodship's party organization plan to 1983. The conviction was expressed that implementation of the tasks for improving the life and working conditions of the voivodship's inhabitants would find support from ZSL [United Peasant Party] and SD [Democratic Party] members. The conciliation front of all party, trade, youth, social, and scientific-technical organizations will be created around the implementation of these tasks.

Then a discussion began. Antoni Organ, member of the KW Executive Boards and first secretary of KG PZPR in Pruchnik, spoke first. He concentrated on the difficult market situation and the troubles of villagers in obtaining, among other things, coal, building materials, fodder and fertilizers. If farmers do not get more of the essential goods they need, then shop shelves will continue to be empty, he said.

In developing his view of the draft of the program for the voivodship's party organization to 1983 in the area of housing construction, Stanislaw Pilek, Deputy member of the Building Cooperative in Przeworsk, turned his attention to the need for consistent implementation of this program and the need for the inspiring role of party members in this process in which the entire society should participate. Otherwise, the program--even the best program--will exist only on paper.

Przemyslaw Przymuszynski, KW member and director of the Voivodship Joint Hospital in Przemyśl, in reference to the draft of the program for the voivodship party organization in the area of health service, presented, in part, specific measures undertaken in the last period for improving the local base through repairs and modernization.

Anna Kowalska, member of the KW Executive Boards and first secretary of KMG PZPR in Dynów, said, in part, "We need more determination and more concrete measures. We must battle indifference and torpor. No one will strengthen the voivodship party organization for us, no one will bring the party's program closer to the needs and expectations of society."

Stanislaw Sobczuk, first secretary of the KM PZPR in Przemyśl, concentrated on the problem of keeping law and order, which, in his opinion, is one of the conditions for overcoming the present crisis. There exists the need for intensifying efforts and actions with the purpose of returning law and order to society. In referring to the meeting of the first secretary of the KZ PZPR, Gen Wojciech

Jaruzelski, with Cardinal Jozef Glomp and the leader of KW NSZZ [Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union National Committee] Solidarity, Lech Walesa, Sobczuk emphasized that it gave rise to a great deal of optimism and hope. But there is no want of those who find the building of the Front of National Conciliation based on the principle contained in the constitution of PRL not to their liking.

The speaker also tabled the motion on the final decision on the soundness of the objections directed against some members of the voivodship authorities in May 1981.

Adam Witek, member of the KW and president of Gmina Cooperative "Sch" in Orla, spoke of the difficult problems of supplying farmers with coal, building materials and means for production. At the conclusion of his speech, he proposed that the next plenary session of the KW--considering the importance of the problem--take up the agriculture question.

Julian Maternowski, KW member and a farmer from Leczachow (Sieniewa Gmina), supported this motion. He also focused on the need for strengthening agricultural circles with an important share in the development of agriculture and in the program for feeding the nation.

Stanislaw Jucha, KW member and a master at the Metal Works in Jaroslaw, pointed (in part) to the necessity for more aggressiveness and inventiveness in activities of PZPR members. The party must identify itself with consistency in its conduct and dealings. We are making small steps but sure ones, he said. Then even our program accepted at the ninth congress will inspire the confidence of the entire society.

We must consistently fight against everything wrong with our party, Tadeusz Mrzyglod, first secretary of the KW PZPR in Lubaczow, said in part. He also remarked on the draft of the program for action of the voivodship party organization to 1983. Jozef Riany, member of the KW and master at the Mechanical Works of the WSK Transport Equipment Plant in Przeworsk, made an observation on this program in regard to economic reform.

Teodor Kuropatwa, first secretary of the KZ party in DRKP Regional Directorate of State Railroads in Przemyśl, touched, in part, upon the problems rankling railroadmen with particular regard to the living conditions of work forces.

Comrade Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak also spoke out at the KW plenum in Przemyśl. In part, he brought into prominence the key role played by POP and OOP in realizing the program of the ninth congress of the party and decisions of the KC and, above all, of the resolution of the fourth plenum of the KC, which--as he emphasized--needs to be implemented on a broad basis. The party apparatus, both the eligible and permanent, must serve the good, effective work of the basic elements of the PZPR. Mutual goodwill plays an important role in party ranks, as do the awareness of the possibility of relying on comrades and the overcoming of a passive attitude toward facts and phenomena harming the party and society.

The secretary of the KC stressed the importance of implementing the idea of national conciliation. He said that the conciliation front should have leading the country out of crisis as its main goal because it is the most important goal of all Poles. Getting out of the crisis depends on society's starting to do solid work as quickly as possible, precisely in the name of this conciliation.

In the unanimously ratified resolution, the Voivodship committee confirmed and accepted for implementation the tasks in the program for action of the voivodship party organization to 1983. It has been resolved that one should turn to the people of the voivodship of Przemysl with a call for support and active participation in implementing this program.

In the final part of the deliberation, internal party matters were examined. Accepted for approval was the information on the work of the KW Executive Boards from July to November 1981; the plan and subject matter of the plenary sessions of the KW for the first half of 1982 were accepted; and it confirmed the set of problems of the KW Executive Boards session. In continuing its examination of organizational matters, the plenum unanimously approved the proposal presented by the KW Executive Boards for changes in the structure and functioning of the KW PZPR; KW Executive Boards' proposals submitted by Ryszard Turko were approved by the plenum. These proposals deal with the filling of managers' positions in the following sections: organizational (Zbigniew Walow), administrative (Stanislaw Kornak), ideological (Boleslaw Zoellner), and socio-economic (Andrzej Patocki). Personal proposals for manager positions in the remaining sections--social-agricultural and general or office sections of the KW PZPR--the Executive Boards will present at a later fixed date.

The KW plenum released Andrzej Kolachinski, at his request, from his duties as a KW member, in connection with his transfer to another voivodship.

9866

CSO: 2600/149

NEW RADOM GOVERNOR, COL ALOJZY WOJCIECHOWSKI, DISCUSSES DUTIES

Kielce SLOWO LUDU in Polish 24-27 Dec 81 p 2

[Interview with Col Alojzy Wojciechowski, the newly appointed governor of Radom, by Jerzy Figas of SLOWO LUDU: "I Do Not Believe in the Impossible"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] You began to fulfill your duties as governor by visiting working establishments. Does this also signify--besides a so-called eye for economics--the confirmation of the military principle: The more difficult the situation, the more often a commander should be among his soldiers?

[Answer] This is definitely so. We all know how critical an issue transportation is. Therefore, I directed my first steps toward the employees of WPKM [Voivodship Municipal Transportation Enterprise]. Then it was the "Kozienice" Power Plant and the local hospital, still under construction. Afterward, I visited the Radom dairy plants and today (Tuesday--postscript J.F. [expansion unknown])--I will see the heating plant engineers. The holidays are approaching and we will be staying in our homes more; therefore, our homes should be warm. But will they be? I would also like to exchange a few words with the young people--representatives of the organization ZSM [Union of Polish Socialist Youth]. Next week, I must find time for a meeting with representatives of education and culture. In any case, I will avow one thing: I will not allow myself to become "interbred with an easy chair."

[Question] What are your first observations?

[Answer] I came to Radom to assume the new post with mixed feelings. This city received much publicity lately and not in the best light. After not quite 7 days--actually seven 24-hour periods in practice--I find that the image of Radom and its region has become more clear to me. Countless numbers of people here have a respect for work, are very orderly and prudent and recognize the causes of the general public. Let us try constantly to expand this sphere together and settle what needs to be settled.

[Question] What have you already managed to learn about the most important problems in the province?

[Answer] Despite all appearances I have learned quite a lot. For example, I was looking over the recent report on the state of the province. The picture in large part was unfortunately frightening. In health services, housing, the

municipal economy and other basic areas, we are either in 48th or 49th place in national statistics. Although the situation is very difficult, certain economic, governmental decisions are indispensable. However, this does not change yet another truth: Certain irregularities and organizational incompetence--the latter in, for example, governmental offices and in commerce, which simply causes outrage--may be eliminated and in this way the trust of society, which is so greatly needed today may be gained. For me, this is the primary task.

[Question] I had the opportunity to become better acquainted with you during Monday's session of the KW [voivodship committee] executive board, when you very emphatically demonstrated the need for the immediate elimination of certain regulatory absurdities in commerce in Radom. This time, energetic action is not only the result of the officer's uniform.

[Answer] Certain traits are undoubtedly not acquired; they simply are innate. I understand organization well--and this is how my superiors see it.

[Question] To a certain extent, this is the very way you also let yourself be known to the residents of Radom who were standing in line during Monday's inspection of certain stores.

[Answer] Indeed I did visit several establishments in Radom that day. I cannot agree with the practice of the manager or the employees not knowing when bread on cream will be delivered. There is no telephone but buses are in service. It is possible to get to the bakery or dairy. Clients must have accurate information. This is not only a question of information. If carp is to be sold at 1 pm, then it must be delivered at that time.

[Question] What are your findings from the commercial inspection?

[Answer] The network in Radom is particularly meager and badly situated. The field of action is limited--but it does exist. All available store space should be utilized. It has become the custom that bread can be sold only "where it has always been sold," even though it is a 2 km space. It does not matter that close by are stores that can easily distribute baked goods. Similar nonsense abounds and we will begin eliminating it.

[Question] What were your first decisions?

[Answer] In Kozienice is a splendid hospital building that is almost completed. This establishment has excellent, modern equipment. It is still not fully functioning because, among other things, the staff lacks about 90 people. There are not enough people because there are no living quarters for them. I have taken preliminary steps so that the administrative building being built in Kozienice may be set aside as lodging for employees of the hospital. Next year, there should be no problem.

It was customary in Radom that WPKN transportation did not operate on the first day of the holidays [Christmas]. This year, buses will be in service during the 3 days of Christmas on a Sunday schedule.

[Question] The most important particulars from the biography of the new governor of Radom were contained in a PAP communique. May we ask to have them supplemented?

[Answer] Of course you may. My wife is a secondary school principal. Because of this, I also know quite a lot about young people. My daughter is a zoologist and works in production at PAN [Polish Academy of Sciences] on the outskirts of Warsaw. As a result, I am acquainted with agricultural problems. I have a great fondness for technology. As a military man, I was, among other things, the chief of the so-called elements of repair and of development and the chief of provisions. This experience will be of great benefit now. Up to now--although life after 50 begins to "jam up"--I do not know what it means to be sick and I cannot imagine not coming to work. More specifically, I do not like it when someone pretends to be working or sick.

I hail from Poznan. My father was a railwayman. I remember how he used to say that his first purchase was a watch; he instilled in me that I should always live in harmony with time and that is, in fact, how I act.

[Question] On the KW executive board, you announced that you would evaluate the administrative cadre by the end of January.

[Answer] That is correct. I have a principle: I must know with whom I am working. I must know my subordinates--their morale, their professional preparation and their competence. I will help those who cannot manage in today's conditions; I will force out those who do not want to work well and I will deal severely with those who are spiteful.

[Question] We are talking on the eve of the traditional holidays [Christmas].

[Answer] In accordance with tradition, we must not forget our holiday wishes for those near and dear. This year's holidays will be and should be different. Let the moments pass by peacefully in the midst of family at the holiday table, on which basic articles of food should not be lacking. Let our shared thoughts enable us to strengthen this peace. This is the most important thing for all of us.

[Question] Thank you for the conversation.

9853

CSO: 2600/260

MODERNIZATION, DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY EDUCATION DISCUSSED

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 20 Jan 82 p 3

[Article by Col (docent, doctor habilitatus) Jerzy Cytowski: "Attainments and Development of Military Academy Education"]

[Text] In accordance with long-range modernization and development plans for military academies, their organizational structures, education programs, instruction-training, and instruction-research activity have been improved in recent years. In addition, the qualifications of academy instructors have been raised; the technical and educational base and patronage activity with respect to higher officer schools (military colleges) were expanded.

Fundamental intraorganizational changes were made in all military academies and in the Heroes of the Westerplatte Higher Naval School in the 1970's. Many faculties and departments were created or modernized; permanent as well as nonpermanent institutes were established in them. The Military Technical Academy organized its branch in Olsztyn, in which it trains specialists in armaments and electronics, while the Military Medical Academy established the Institute of Postgraduate Training, which was subsequently changed to the Center for Postgraduate Training. Postgraduate studies in various specialties were carried on in all the academies. This program of improving officer qualifications is continuing to be perfected from an organizational as well as program standpoint.

Program--A Starting Point

Instruction programs in all military academic schools are constantly being modernized. A substantial amount of time is earmarked in the Polish Army General Staff Academy for overall military studies and tactical-operational troop exercises in which academy students participate. An instruction-training specialization was introduced to qualify students for such work. All graduates receive titles as qualified officers.

Instruction programs in the Military Political Academy have been adapted to the level of higher officer school student-graduates who begin studies at the academy after a appropriate training in military units. These studies are concluded by earning a master's degree in education, history or economics.

The Military Technical Academy introduced a program of uniform technical studies in the mid-1970's. Graduates receive master's degrees in specified fields of engineering. Under a separate program intramural studies are conducted for especially capable higher officer school graduates who, after 1 year in such schools, participate in 1-year of preparatory training and then immediately begin at the academy. Some students pursue a special program that prepares them for instruction and science-research work in higher officer schools and military technical institutes.

Instructional programs are also being improved in the Military Medical Academy and the Higher Naval School. Advanced professional studies in the area of sociopolitical sciences have also been initiated in the latter school. Thus, integrated programs of sociopolitical, tactical-technical and specialized studies have been introduced at all military academies. These are adapted to the practical needs of particular kinds of troops and services.

Role of the Teaching-Training Staff

Much attention was devoted in the total military program to the selection and development of the teaching-training staff. In 1974, the General Staff Academy developed a "Model of a Military Instructor," while the Military Political Academy prepared a "Model Outline of an Instructor-Trainer in the Field of Social Sciences and the Criteria for His Evaluation." The principles of recruitment and the requirements relative to military instruction-training workers, their personality, education, development and evaluation criteria were included in both studies. Post-graduate studies, specialized and doctoral, were intensified; greater weight was attached to degrees and educational titles. Special emphasis was placed on the education and development of a young academic teaching staff. Military academy workers organized doctoral study branches in some garrisons. Wider utilization was begun in military academies and higher officer schools of nonfaculty officers with appropriate specialized knowledge, as well as of the employment of retired officers and civilian academy instructors for instruction-training work.

This principle continues to be utilized. In 1980, a "List of a Military Academy Instructor's Rights and Obligations" was introduced. Among others, the following items appear in it: the role and tasks of military academy instructors, the principles of appointment to their positions, their educational background, professional capability, advancement and rights. In the defense minister's directive implementing the list of rights and obligations, mention is made, among others, of the special position of military academy instructors, of the fact that "the staff potential of higher military education simultaneously determines the level of the entire professional staff, the development and progress of science and of military technology.

Improvement of the Education Process

In recent years, just as in earlier periods, the instruction-training process in military academic schools has constantly been improved. Among the most essential directions of this process are:

--the elimination of traditional lectures in favor of independent acquisition of knowledge by students and officer cadets, making it possible for the most capable of them to study at an individual tempo;

--the standardization of continuing education whose basic element was the education of a younger instruction-training staff;

--the identification and education of exceptionally qualified students and officer cadets;

--the modernization of student, and especially officer, cadet training practices by extending their stay in military units;

--utilization of electronic computer technology and informational systems during the instruction process;

--broader utilization of experience gained from exercises with troops conducted at various levels of command.

These general directions for the improvement of the instruction-training process were adapted by each military academic school to its own specialized tasks. Experience acquired in this area was, among others, presented at various symposium and conference levels. The results, enriched by research, formed the basis of standard instructions pertaining to the educational system, innovative teaching methods, utilization of technical means of instruction and the like.

Instruction-Research Activity

Military academic schools have also conducted instruction-research activity, which produces even better results. The conduct of this work was governed by the desire to relax instruction-research, with a systematic, overall and interdisciplinary approach to such research and to improve cooperation between the Ministry of National Defense's central offices and institutions and individual schools and between the organizational elements of a given school and its workers. A great deal of attention was paid to making the school's organizational structure more flexible, thus allowing it to appropriately utilize its resources and staff for the creation of summary research groups solving individual problems and research subjects.

The proper priority of instruction-research work, as well as the evaluation of workers, teams and schools in relation to the results of such work, is a basic problem. It is accomplished in the closest linkage of the school's instruction-research work with units and institutions of the Polish Republic's army and brother armies of Warsaw Pact states. Relieving workers who undertake instruction-research activity from administrative, economic and other activities that do not require educational qualifications was also not forgotten.

These directives were adapted in practice to the nature of individual schools. Research work in the General Staff Academy was dominated by subjects pertaining to the art of war, the general theory of war, or the national defense system. The Political Military Academy concentrated its research efforts on such problems as the individuality of the modern political officer; military discipline, leadership and competition in the military; sociopolitical and psychological aspects of modern armed warfare; the influence of historic knowledge on shaping the socialist awareness of the people of Poland; and the sociopolitical consequences of the science-technology revolution. The Military Technical Academy undertook research work connected with the development of military technology, improvement in the building of military

equipment, the technology of its production and principles of its utilization in peace or war. The Military Medical Academy as well as its Center for Postgraduate Training also carried on broad science-research activity. Among the most fundamental attainments of military medical research are the grafting of a synthetic heart valve, development of uniform principles of procedure in the event of massive thermal injuries and research on the effect of ionizing radiation on the human organism. The Higher Naval School also intensified its science-research activity in the 1970's, among others in the area of crew navigation-hydrographic safety, use of ship equipment, technology of its construction and repair, operational reliability of ship technology and armament and improvement of ship propulsion systems.

Many of the science-research results of military academic school efforts served the needs not only of national defense but also society and the national economy.

The Necessity for Constant Modernization

Technical means of instruction in military academy training and administration continue to be improved. Computer centers were established and incorporated in the school instruction-training system. Lecture and assembly rooms, laboratories, special classrooms and workshops, leadership positions and (experimental) ranges were expanded and improved. They were equipped with essential scientific aids, audiovisual centers and equipment for automating the instruction process. Automated and computerized equipment was introduced in school administration and computational work. The system of planning and reporting was improved. The work of scientific libraries and activity connected with scientific information was made more efficient and statistical libraries were expanded. Automation and computer science are being introduced ever more widely in the instruction and administration process, as is educational television.

Beginning with 1974, military academies took over the patronage of specified higher military colleges. This cooperation covers party-political, instruction-training and science-research activity. Initially, it was organized on the spot, but gradually it took on a planned character.

The experience gained in this area makes improvements possible. The idea of basing patronage activities on partnership principles is beginning to take shape. It is necessary to proceed from an exchange of information between academic and higher military colleges on a general scale to an exchange between cells, problem (solving) groups and individual workers. Academies ought to provide still more aid to higher military colleges in improving teaching programs and improving the qualifications of instruction staffs of such schools.

10433

CSO: 2600/244

BRIEFS

NEW ART SCHOOL RECTOR--The Ministry of Culture and Art has announced that studies will be resumed at the State Higher School of Fine Arts in Wroclaw on 15 February. Due to the resignation of Docent Jan Jaromir Aleksium from the post of rector of the school, the minister of culture and art has named Docent Rufin Kominek to this position. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 12 Feb 82 p 5]

ZMW YOUTH COOPERATIVES--In view of the huge shortage of various social-living and production services existing in rural areas, the youth service cooperatives which are starting to be formed on the initiative of the Rural Youth Union (ZMW) may prove to be of great significance. There are already examples in this area of specific actions undertaken directly by ZMW members and circles based on a recognition of local needs and specific contingencies. The nuclei of the first rural youth service-production cooperatives appeared i.a. in the Przemysl, Krakow, Rzeszow, Lodz, Bialystok and Ciechanow voivodships. By spring several of the first cooperatives are to begin specific activity in the production of construction materials, repair materials, etc. [Text] [Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21 Jan 82 p 3]

CSO: 2600/346

TRADITION OF RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF JEWS, OTHER MINORITIES STRESSED

Bucharest REVISTA DE ISTORIE in Romanian Dec 81 pp 2177-2197

[Article by Ion M. Oprea: "The Defense of the National Sovereignty of Romania at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920)"]

[Excerpts] The special efforts made by the Paris peace conference to protect ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities were only the continuation and the application, in different conditions and in a much larger geographic area, of an older practice and principle of international law. The special attention given to the protection of the national minorities had its source in the general conviction that the ensuring of optimum conditions which would give the minorities an opportunity to live together in harmony with the majority nationalities could contribute to the maintenance of a lasting peace in the entire world. This consideration was fully valid since the idea of the protection of minorities had a universal character or, more precisely, its application was obligatory, in various forms and by various methods, in all the states which had national minorities. The Supreme Council of the peace conference organized special commissions to examine the problem of the protection of the national minorities and to formulate solutions. Although the representatives of the small countries did not participate in the proceedings of these commissions, since they were not invited, they sent the commissions reports on the attitudes of their governments regarding the protection of the national minorities. The Romanian delegation gave the president of the commission, Philippe Berthelot, information on the way in which the Romanian Government would act to respect the rights of the national minorities. In a letter addressed to the special commission, on 27 May 1919, the members of the Romanian delegation informed the peace conference that a number of laws and provisions had been adopted in Romania which assured equality of rights, under the law, "of all citizens regardless of race or religion." The delegation stated in this letter that in Romania "any individual born in Romania who does not have foreign citizenship and any resident of the territories recently united with Romania, with the exception of those people who have expressed a desire to choose another citizenship, is considered to be a Romanian citizen."

Inspired by the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, the Romanian Government had already taken the appropriate juridical measures to guarantee to the national minorities and religious groups the opportunity to exercise their fundamental rights. The most eloquent expression of the implementation of this

principle was the decree and law on the naturalization of the Jews, adopted by the Romanian Government on 22 May 1919. According to the decree, "Adult Jewish residents, from the old kingdom, born in the country or born abroad to parents who had their residence in the country, who have not been subjects of any foreign state, are Romanian citizens and will enjoy all the rights of citizens if they manifest this intention by stating that they were born in Romania and that they have not benefitted from foreign protection."

The entering into effect of this decree solved the problem of the naturalization of the Jews and put an end to "a number of misunderstandings and troubles" in the domestic and foreign area, which had lasted for a long time. It also gave satisfaction to a natural characteristic of the Romanian people who were always "noted for their great tolerance" and profound understanding of the interests of the national minorities. In accordance with the juridical measures taken within the country, the Romanian delegation to the peace conference voted "in favor of the proposals referring to the protection of minorities by the League of Nations."

The fact that the situation of the Jews, which was rather precarious in the 19th Century, worsened after World War I in a number of European countries as a result of the revival of a strong movement against the Jews, who were considered to be Germanophiles or Bolsheviks, attracted the attention of some representatives of the allied powers in the Supreme Council. President Wilson considered that the persecution of the Jews was "one of the elements which disturbed the peace of the world."

Invoking a number of facts which confirmed that the Romanian authorities had given harsh treatment to Jews both before and during World War I, the president of the United States expressed his lack of confidence in the pledges made by the Romanian Government through the law on the naturalization of the Jews in May 1919. In support of his position, President Wilson reminded the Supreme Council that King Carol and his government did not respect the provisions of Article 44 of the Berlin Treaty concluded in 1878 which provided for the equitable solution of the Jewish problem.

It is certain that neither by the law on the naturalization of the Jews or by other measures and provisions which actually signified progress in the Romanian legislation intended to protect the national minorities under the law did the bourgeois-landlord governing circles intend to abandon the general orientation of their policy of national feuding. However, since this orientation was common to the international bourgeoisie, the pretension of the governing circles of the allied Great Powers to intervene with their own measures to protect the national minorities in Romania revealed its complete groundlessness.

Viewed in the light of these realities, the evocation of reprehensible political acts from the past on the part of the Romanian Government were intended, first of all, to justify the arbitrary measures which were to be taken against Romania and to mask the legalization of the interference of the allied Great Powers in Romanian internal affairs.

The decision of the victorious Great Powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Romania and of the other small allied states in Central and Southeastern Europe,

under the pretext of protecting the national minorities, written in the draft treaty with Austria, could not be kept secret although the discussions of the Supreme Council took place in the strictest secrecy.

Informed unofficially about the content and meaning of this resolution, the allied small states planned, at the peace conference, common action for the purpose of preventing the violation of their national sovereignty.

The objections of the Romanian delegation were directed, in particular, against Article 60 of the draft of the peace treaty with Austria. The Romanian delegation made a clear distinction between the matter of the protection of the national minorities and the religious tolerance already resolved, in a juridical manner, on the territory of Romania and the matter of the monitoring of this protection by the allied Great Powers. It expressed its support for the protection of the national minorities through measures with a national character, proposing that the peace treaty with Austria mention that: "Romania accords to all linguistic, racial or religious minorities who live within its borders, rights which are equal to those of other Romanian citizens."

At the same time, the Romanian delegation declared that it was ready to accept any international measures which the Society of Nations would adopt and apply for the purpose of protecting ethnic minorities and religious groups. This proposal was not accepted by the allied Great Powers. They considered that the issue of protection, from outside, of national minorities should affect only the allied small states in Central and Eastern Europe, thus violating the principle of the equality of states before international law. This discrimination appeared all the more flagrant since the Great European Allies had conceded, in the secret treaty of August 1916, Romania's right to participate in the peace conference on an equal basis with all the other large and small countries. The Romanian delegation condemned the discriminatory measures taken by the Supreme Council. The delegation denounced the fact that although the measures concerning the monitoring of the protection of national minorities were imposed exclusively on the states which were the so-called heirs of the Austrian-Hungarian empire, Italy, a great power, was not obliged to respect them. The privilege which Italy enjoyed was extended to the other allied large states. For different reasons, no international obligation was formally provided for the protection of national and religious minorities in England, France, the United States, Belgium, etc.

Parallel with the diplomatic struggle carried on to counteract the intervention of the Supreme Council of the peace conference, the block of allied small states consisting of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had to reject an avalanche of tendentious arguments and information supplied by the propaganda offices of the Horthyist government and to surmount the difficulties arising during discussions dealing with the conclusion of the peace treaty with Hungary, the draft of which was given to the Hungarian delegation on 16 January 1920.

For almost a month, the clauses of this treaty were examined by the members of the Hungarian delegation headed by Count Appony who embodied the reactionary and intolerant concept of diplomacy prompted by the nobility in Hungary before the war. In the spirit of this concept, the Hungarian delegation formulated its comments on the clauses of the draft treaty and sent them to the peace conference on 10 February 1920.

Appony tried to demonstrate that the draft treaty did not take into consideration the political, economic and geographic unity which the pre-war Hungarian state had inherited, supposedly, from nature. These comments and similar ones provoked the vehement opposition of the Romanian, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav delegations.

Demonstrating the inconsistency of the arguments of the Hungarian delegation, the representatives of the three allied small states took the first step in rejecting the point of view of Count Appony, who, with no basis, criticized the treaty because its provisions regarding the liberation of people from national subjugation exercised by the Hungarian ruling classes violated the principle of national minorities and destroyed the political unity which "nature itself had predestined for Hungary." In addition, the Hungarian delegation was not able to deny that the unity of pre-war Hungary was the expression of certain political aspirations and not of national unity.

Thus by attempting to identify the artificial political unity of pre-war Hungary, based on constriction, with its so-called national unity, the head of the Hungarian delegation could not convince the peace conference that the treaty violated the principle of nations. The same groundlessness characterizes other arguments by which the Hungarian delegation tried to demonstrate that the so-called political unity of pre-war Hungary was the result of its economic unity and of natural geographic conditions.

As an interpreter of the tendencies manifested by the dominant circles in Hungary, the Hungarian delegation, inspired by Count Appony, responded at the last moment, to the proposal that the will of the minority population in the former Hapsburg Empire be consulted through the organization of a plebiscite. Examining the significance of the Appony proposal, the members of the Romanian, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav delegations called the attention of the Supreme Council to the fact that the will of the Romanian population and of the national minorities was expressed in impressive peoples assemblies which decided upon the union of Transylvania with Romania. They stressed in the joint memo addressed to the peace conference that, in these public meetings, the option of the Romanian and minority population was consecrated in a solemn and definitive manner and that the attempt to deny the validity of such national assemblies by replacing them with a plebiscite or, more precisely, with an electoral system which served only to impose a systematic silence on the political will of the non-Hungarian peoples has no validity.

Convinced that the manifestations of the Romanian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak population for liberation from the Austro-Hungarian yoke had an incomparably greater value than any plebiscite, the representatives of the bloc formed of the three allied countries rejected the claims of the Hungarian delegation, stating that they considered the boundaries set in the Supreme Council Session of 11 June 1919 as final and beyond discussion.

After the conclusion of the discussions on the territorial clauses in the peace treaty with Hungary, the representative of Romania at the peace conference asked the Supreme Council to maintain unchanged the military, naval and air clauses written in the draft treaty because they were identical with those imposed on the other conquered countries. In addition, the efforts of the Hungarian delegation were useless because in March 1920, the conference of ambassadors and foreign

ministers presided over by Lord Curzon, taking into consideration the joint memorandum of the delegations of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, decided that the draft treaty with Hungary would remain final. The international recognition of the union of Transylvania and of the other Romanian provinces with the motherland was, on the one hand, the result of the diplomatic activity of the Romanian delegation at the peace conference and, on the other hand, the expression of the full recognition of the justness of the inviolable national rights of the Romanian people.

CSO: 2700/174

SITUATION OF JEWS UNDER COMPULSORY LABOR SYSTEM OF WW II

Bucharest REVISTA DE ISTORIE in Romanian Dec 81 pp 2199-2212

[Article by Dumitru Tutu: "The Organization of the Labor Force in Romania during the Years of the Hitlerite War 1941-1944"]

[Excerpts] During the years 1941-1944, the labor force in Romania was subjected to compulsory work. Decree--law of 15 May 1941 instituted compulsory work for all inhabitants of the country and the authorities were authorized to monitor the presence of each person during working hours. For this purpose, obligatory work cards were introduced. Persons fit for work who did not have any productive activity could be made to perform obligatory work. In 1941, some of the industrial enterprises were mobilized and placed under the control of the armed forces. In these enterprises, workers were subject to the provisions of military regulations.

By decree--law No 3983 of 5 December 1940, Jews were excluded from the obligation of military service and, as a result, they were not subject to being sent to the front when Romania entered the war. Instead, all male Jews between 18 and 50 years of age were obliged to pay military taxes and to execute public service work, regardless of the social category to which they belonged. The regulation referring to the military statutes appeared in June 1941. In regard to the military statutes for Jews, the decree and law mentioned above states that "public service work is executed by Jews between 18 and 50 years of age, either individually or in groups or detachments. The utilization of Jews in public service jobs is executed only by the General Staff."

During their public service work, the Jews wore civilian dress and lived in their own homes if they worked in the localities in which they lived. If they were assigned to external detachments, that is, outside the cities or communes in which they lived, they were obliged to have with them equipment as well as a mattress, blanket, pillow and individual dishes. The poorest of them were paid a ridiculous sum of 15 lei a day for the wear and tear on the equipment. The food and wages benefits were the same as those of the troops. The work day was 9 hours, regardless of the place of work, and legal holidays were observed.

Obligatory work for Jews was decided on 2 August 1941 and on 3 August 1941, the Ministry of Internal Affairs gave orders to execute the decision. On the basis of this measure, in August 1941, some 11,124 Jews (males between 21 and 40 years of age) were sent to work in the provinces and 5,876 Jews (males between 18 and 20 and 41 and 50 years of age) worked in Bucharest. On 6 August 1941, the issue of

the obligatory work of Jewish males between 18 and 50 years of age was taken over by the General Staff and the Ministry of Internal Affairs continued to handle the issue in regard to other Jewish males, up to 18 years of age and over 50 years of age, and in regard to Jewish women.

As of 1 October 1941, there were 84,042 Jews between the ages of 18 and 50 who were fit for work. During 1941, only 47,345 of these participated in obligatory work. The rest were exempt for various reasons. Thus, 9,365 worked in industry, trade and offices; 11,933 were intellectuals and were not used for manual labor; 15,399 had unclear situations.

In accordance with Law--decree of June 1941 Jews 18 and 19 years of age and those from 41 to 50 years of age were assigned to work in units and institutions in the cities in which they lived and those from 21 to 40 years of age were assigned to external work detachments. By order No 10,009 of 13 October 1941, the Ministry of Internal Affairs informed the county prefects' offices that "Jews should be employed in work of public interest in the production of various articles for the armed forces: gloves, stockings, knitwear, etc."

Decree--law No 2650 of 8 August 1940 classified Jews in 3 categories from a political, juridical and economic point of view. Jews who had settled in Romania before 1918, were in Category I; those who obtained naturalization under certain conditions were in Category II and the rest of the Jews were in Category III. But this classification did not play any role in regard to the obligations to perform public service work. However, there were a number of factors which contributed to the failure to use a large number of Jews for obligatory work assignments.

A note from the General Staff in 1941 reveals that they suffered great material sacrifices to avoid doing this work. During 1942, only 15,015 Jews, 53 percent of the 28,650 [eligible] presented themselves for work in external work detachments. The same year, for the entire country, the Central Reviewing Commission excused 16,922 Jews--a larger number than anticipated, who were working in industry and various institutions. In addition, the enterprises "bombaraded" the General Staff with hundreds and thousands of requests for the dispensation from obligatory work of Jews who were specialists in various branches of industry.

In 1943, the number of Jews who were assigned to take part in obligatory work was 101,641 males between the ages of 18 and 50. In 1944 (up to 23 August) 10,024 Jews, in 19 detachments, were mobilized for obligatory work and were used in fortifications and roads projects, in building dams, etc.

On 30 August 1944, the detachments of Jews were disbanded and the obligatory work system ended. During the years of the military dictatorship of Antonescu, a large number of Jews were deported. The great majority (42,000) were from Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia. About 800 Jews, anti-fascist fighters, members of the Romanian Communist Party, were deported from Transylvania, Moldavia, Oltenia, the Banat, Crisana, and Muntenia. Some 700 of these were interned in the Ribnita and Grosulovo concentration camps. On 16 March 1944, the Romanian General Staff ordered that all Jews deported to the area on the other side of the Nistru River should be transported into the country. The Jews in Grosulovo and Ribnita were transported to the Tirgu Jiu camp and those who came from Bessarabia and Northern

Bucovina remained in their home cities and communes. During the war the Jews were also used for clearing away snow.

Jewish women were used on the front as doctors or auxiliary medical personnel and for the repairing of military equipment and similar work. In May 1944, all able-bodied workers, including old men, children, and women were used to building fortifications in Moldavia.

Poor Jews, in particular, were used for manual labor. The rich Jews were excused for various reasons; either they were required to serve as specialists in industry, trade or various institutions or they paid large sums of money to avoid obligatory work. The above data show that sometimes less than half of the total number of Jews obliged to execute compulsory work actually showed up. The Jewish labor detachments worked under the direction and leadership of the Romanian authorities. The Antonescu government rejected the requests of the German Command to place the Jewish detachments under its orders, claiming that the Germans exterminated them.

CSO: 2700/178

BRIEFS

APPOINTMENT IN IALOMITA--In as much as the position of chairman of the executive committee of the people's council of Ialomita County has become vacant, on the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Gheorghe Tanase is delegated to fill the position of chairman of the executive committee of the people's council of Ialomita County. [Excerpts]
[Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 10, 26 Jan 82 p 1]

CSO: 2700/178

STRUCTURE OF TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION DISCUSSED

How To Be More Effective

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by D. Vucinic]

[Text] The organization of Yugoslav trade unions is discussed, along with the differences at various levels and between republics and provinces, and the justifications for these differences.

Are the trade unions true workers' organizations, and to what extent? How much do they help workers to be better self-management operators, to influence crucial decisions at every level?

These questions have been asked since the first days of the pre-congress debates, beginning in October 1981, and they form the topic of today's investigation.

Yugoslavia is the only country in the world in which self-management has been developing for more than 30 years. We alone in the world have involved the entire people in "state business," and our trade union organization is the only working class organization institutionalized in the political system of its country. Thus by the nature of things, the trade union organization no longer concerns itself merely with workers' rights; rather, its primary goal is to build new social relationships. The question is: How can the trade union organization realize its historical role, which as we said, is built into our fundamental laws, the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor.

A Broad Fan of Indebtedness

In a republic of labor such as we are building, the workers, the creators of all values, have a basic right to dispose of their creation. For that reason, they are given the dominant place in the Yugoslav Constitution, and naturally, in the "small constitution," as the Law on Associated Labor has been called. In the latter, the position of organized workers--that is, of the trade union organization--is elaborated in more or less detail in over 80 articles.

It is a question of the obligations of this organization of millions in creating conditions for earning and distributing income; its participation in approving agreements and contracts concerning all essential social matters, plans and programs for the country's development, decisionmaking in associated labor, informing the

workers, selecting and calling delegates and self-management workers control staff, management agencies, the protection of workers' rights, social property, grievance resolution, training of workers for self-management involvement, delegate responsibilities and naturally, the special preparation of the trade union organization for such complex responsibilities. The Law on Associated Labor is especially precise in detailing the obligations of the trade union organization in the fundamental unit, the basic organization of associated labor.

Adequate decisions are being sought for the implementation of these responsibilities of the 6 million-member organization, particularly in the basic and the opstina organizations. Since the constitutional amendments of 1971, the debate has continued on a new form of organization. In the discussion, basically two varying approaches to trade union organization emerged. In Croatia and Slovenia, where the trade union traditions are long-standing, they believed that the specialized trade unions were the right form of worker organization. A similar view is held in Serbia and Vojvodina, but it differs a bit in Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia and Hercegovina. These differences continue to exist.

The Trade Union and the Delegate Basis

The constitution and the Law on Associated Labor perceive that in our political system the workers' interests will be manifested in the delegate procedure in socio-political communities, opstinas, provinces and republics. Thus it seemed completely logical and natural that those communities should also be the basis of trade union organization; i.e., that the opstina, province and republic trade union councils should have the dominant role. That is the so-called "territorial" or "horizontal" principle of trade union organization.

Yet besides that, the notions of a specialized trade union organization have not died away. On the contrary, they have become stronger. Some believe that if the trade union is not organized according to craft, it will not be able to represent every worker's interest completely. Any other trade union organizing principle would bring a loss of purpose, of a reason for existing, and it would become a general, unsubstantial organization of no use to the workers. In opposition to this, there are views that this sort of trade union could be class-oriented, that it could confront the working class, that it would not fit the spirit of our times.

The debate on these two viewpoints has flared up particularly at times such as the eve of the last trade union congress in 1978. These disagreements, however, were resolved by a Solomon's decision: Let those who think it is better hold to the general "horizontal" principle of trade union organization, while in others the specialized, so-called "vertical" organization can be used. Then after 4 years, at the next congress, we can see which is better.

Hence, in the trade union organization there are today 520 trade union councils of opstinas, 6 republic and 2 province-level organizations and 16 trade union organizations that are usually called "specialized."

(Non)functional Differences

In Croatia, however, these specialized trade union organizations are the basic organizations. The delegates for all trade union councils are elected within them, whether for the opstina, the city, the region, the republic or the federation. In other

republics, these specialized trade unions are only a form of operation, which means that they are concerned with such questions as income distribution, self-management and the organization of labor competitions. As a rule, they do not make decisions. Therefore, some regard them as a "lower" organization, whose narrowness is becoming an increasing obstruction.

Thus today the trade unions are organized according to the craft principle in Croatia, Slovenia and to some extent in Serbia and Bosnia and Hercegovina. In the latter, there are no specialized trade unions at the level of the opstina or the city, while at the republic level there are just a few specialized trade union councils that cover several craft branches each. For example, the energy trade union includes workers from mining, the electric industry, thermoelectric power stations and other related trades.

Since the liberation, there have been several reorganizations of the trade unions. Right after the liberation, they were "unified." With the introduction of self-management in 1950, the specialized form prevailed.

There were 26 trade unions at one time, with 18 in some places. Gradually these forms weakened. Ten years ago, 6 specialized trade union organizations were formed; these existed until 1978. They included organizations for industrial and mining workers, for communications and transportation, agriculture, construction, services and social activities. Thereafter, the industry and mining trade union was divided into 6, social activities into 4, service into 3; the trade unions for construction, agriculture and transportation were untouched. To them were joined workers of specialized commerce and some collectives from the raw material base; that was regarded as the beginning of the organization of trade unions according to complete production cycles, in the spirit of income relationships.

The most complete reorganization was made in Croatia, where the following trade unions are found: Metal production and processing, in chemistry and nonmetals, in wood processing and lumbering, textiles, leather goods and footwear, graphic, publishing and information activities, transportation and communications, maritime and river shipping, ports and docks, agriculture, food processing and tobacco, construction, drafts, communal activities, innkeeping and tourism, commerce, training and education, invalid pension insurance and administration and legal professions.

All of these trade unions also exist at the federation level, but they do not always extend to the base. For example, in Bosnia and Hercegovina they are not found in opstinas and cities.

The workers perceive that inadequate organization hampers trade union action, primarily its affiliation at various levels. This in turn burdens the pooling of labor and resources and even makes possible closings. Today an essential factor is found in the extent to which the trade union organization utilizes the Law on Associated Labor in its actions, and what has been done previously to implement the concept of the trade union organization given in the workers' "small constitution."

Difficulties at the Trade Union 'Top'

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by St. Rajkovic]

[Text] The various forms of trade union organization by republics and provinces cannot fail to affect the League of Yugoslav Trade Unions and the federal councils. Numerous shortcomings result, that these forums cannot eliminate by themselves.

Differences in the form of trade union organization by republics and provinces cannot fail to have consequences at the federal level, the level of federal councils of specialized trade unions or the level of the Council of the League of Yugoslav Trade Unions. Thus criticism of these variations is not unusual: It could be said that they become more vocal and stronger along with growing criticism of parcelization of the economy and introversion into opstina, regional, provincial and republic borders. In discussions with workers, who condemn these divisions and the introversion most sharply, one hears the question as to whether the trade unions contribute to this division. Why do class interests, which should manifest themselves in a "vertical" specialized form from the basic organization to the federation, instead break down at the levels of opstina, province and republic particularism? Most trade union actions are completed at the republic level, so what then is happening with Yugoslavia? What about common actions at a Yugoslav level?

We have 16 specialized trade unions, which in some republics extend to the basic unit. They are the foundation of the entire trade union organization, while in others they do not reach below the republic level. Hence some carry out comprehensive trade union affairs, while others perform only some duties. Thus it is difficult at the federation level to carry out unified actions: Delegates from various republics present different positions, some of which are comprehensive, while others are not. Their conversations sometimes remind one of the conversations of the deaf, as if one "was talking about pears and the other about apples," since various viewpoints are found in the republics.

Therefore, people say openly today that it is unsupportable for specialized trade unions to have one status in one republic and another status in a second one, as if in different countries. These great differences, which are worsening, would not even exist if the trade union organizations would cooperate better among themselves on various levels, if they would do more to perceive and to face positions and experiences and would correct their practices. If things continue, the specialized trade unions will lose their purpose, at least as far as their general function is concerned.

Insufficient Unity of Action

The contributions of the highest Yugoslav trade union body, the Council of the League of Yugoslav Trade Unions, are indisputable; they begin with the preparations for all self-management congresses, include the approval of the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor, and extend to preparing the working class to participate in self-management. In the past 4 years, they have also helped to develop system laws, to pursue actions related to income, rewards for labor, organizing associated labor, protecting workers' rights, maintaining the living standard and other actions.

Recently, however, increasingly sharp criticism has been directed at this forum, including statements that it is not sufficiently operational, especially in implementing the Law on Associated Labor, and that it does not react quickly enough and energetically against the introversion of the economy, the investment mania. Further criticism notes that the trade unions do not exert sufficient effort to overcome inherited disproportions in the development of individual branches and industrial groups.

Those who know the trade unions also know that all these problems have been discussed at sessions of the Council of the League of Yugoslav Trade Unions. The effects, however, have been insufficient. Thus, there has not been enough final trade union action at the level of all Yugoslavia. For example, the Trade Union League Council participates in the task forces of the federation more than anywhere, but it has no delegation in the Yugoslav Assembly. This is not the case in the republics and provinces. Hence the voice of the trade unions does not reach the highest self-management level in our country.

Objections also claim that the Yugoslav Trade Union League Council has separated from its base of the workers, that it is more involved in matters of the "system" than those of the working class and that it associated more with the authorities than with the workers. Its officials, who participate in hundreds of bodies of the Yugoslav Assembly, the LCY Central Committee, the SAWPY, the Economic Chamber and elsewhere, have made their opinions known in some 1,300 system and other regulations of the federation. Perhaps for that reason, many positions from the base and from federal councils never even reached sessions of the council and its presidium. It is said that both of these agencies are overburdened, they they have long sessions, with many items on their agendas, and apparently for that reason only the most responsible people from the republics enter the discussion. This usually takes place before the session. Thus there are more monologues than dialogues.

The Unquestionable Responsibility of Republics and Provinces

After the Yugoslav Presidium, the Trade Union Organization was the first body to implement Comrade Tito's initiative on collective leadership and the 1-year term of office. Two presidents of the Yugoslav Trade Union Council have already served out their terms, while the third took over this function last summer.

The Yugoslav Trade Union Council consists of three councils: One for the political system, one for the economy and one for foreign policy. Thus the council functions more as a front for subjective forces. Nevertheless, the question is being posed as to whether the changes have been beneficial. For example, should all seven commissions of the presidium have been abolished? Each of them contained 20 to 30 experts from each republic and some, 10 from the collectives. In this way 180 interesting opinions on various matters were lost.

Did this not mean, it was asked at the recent session of the Yugoslav Trade Union Council, that decisions of the highest trade union forum have become more generalized, thus insufficiently interesting for the organizations, so that they do not go any farther than republic or province agencies?

It is also asserted that there are difficulties in coordinating the work of trade unions in the republics and that the coordinating council does not always function well. There are further difficulties in bringing positions into harmony with each other. This happens when the right people do not come to sessions or when the spokesmen who do come do not have the opinions of the worker base. Often as well, the differences are too great between the viewpoints of republic and province representatives.

I heard all these criticisms of the work of our highest trade union forums at various sessions of the Yugoslav Trade Union Council, of the council's presidium and of federal councils. Recently, I spoke of these comments with various republic and province officials. The response was very interesting and it went something like the following:

"In the republics and provinces, we are the most responsible for the work of the Yugoslav Trade Union Council, its presidium and commissions and also federal specialized councils. We send people to all those bodies and we are responsible for their character and for the positions they advocate. The quality of personnel was not always considered everywhere, so that the best people from the republics were not necessarily sent to the federation and the positions advocated were not always developed carefully. In the interest of better work by federal trade union agencies, these shortcomings must be corrected by mutual effort."

Since the trade union elections are about to occur (in some places they are already under way or even completed), we are talking about people for the highest trade union forums and, in some republics, about concrete individuals. Let us hope that the proper lessons will be drawn from previous experience.

12131

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TRAINING OF ELITE SABOTAGE UNITS DESCRIBED

Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 335, 21 Nov 81 pp 33, 35

[Article by Mladen Paver: "Sabotage According to Training Program"]

[Text] Sabotage units are a well-guarded secret of every army, and ours is no exception. Far from unwelcome, prying eyes, our sabotage units, composed of the most experienced people, practice how to deliver a fatal blow at an occupier in the most vulnerable places and with minimum material resources. This photo report must strictly obey the rules: inform the public about their activities and at the same time not reveal any military secret.

At our military parades, at the Permanent Exhibit of Armaments and Military Equipment in Nikinci, on our television screens, an observer can find out all sorts of things about the new, military technology of our armed forces. Our armed forces possess the most modern armament in accordance with our adopted defense concept, and the needs of nationwide defensive warfare by which this country would react against any aggression.

We mention only the semi-automatic pursuit rockets used against armor and air targets, the multi-barrel rocket launcher (which "in components" is the ideal guerrilla weapon), the armored amphibious troop carrier, the submarine and rocket gun-boat made for conditions of naval warfare, the jet-fighter bombers "Hawk" and "Eagle."

In order to increase the strike and fire power of our defense, there have been developed, among other things, the Jugo tank, cassette ammunition, various, complex radar-electronic and optical- and other systems which provide the greatest possible precision and deadliness of fire. These arms show how our defense strategy relies upon our own forces; they incorporate the results of scientific research provided by domestic institutes and new technology which has been adopted by our industry.

One might also suggest that our armed forces already have, and are developing, military equipment which is not on display at reviews, in commercial catalogs, or to the public at large.

It is no secret--they learn about it in the secondary schools--that we conceive nationwide defensive warfare to be the merciless armed struggle against a powerful aggressor over every foot of soil in our country. The aggressor must reckon

with the most violent actions of the whole country on the front lines during such a war, as well as with a system of "hedgehogs" behind our lines, with unextinguishable resistance from the territory which might be temporarily occupied.

As our own recent past has taught us that one of the most effective elements in this type of warfare, in which the aggressor is usually superior in numbers and in technology, is the experience of the legendary partisan saboteurs throughout Yugoslavia.

"The broadly based and continually intensive sabotage activity was a significant component of the strategy of the People's Liberation War, the experience of which are especially interesting for the theory and practice of nationwide defense," concludes our MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA, citing that, according to incomplete data, partisan saboteurs destroyed about 150 factories, 114 warehouses, 100 mines, 740 bridges and waterways, 1,800 kilometers of railroad tracks, about 1,100 locomotives, and 14,000 railroad cars. What fleet of bombers has achieved this efficiency?

Are the successors to the partisan saboteurs being prepared today?

We have no doubt about this. More of a problem was how to get the green light to report from their surroundings. Assembled in the headquarters of the territorial defense, the subjects of our report agreed to talk about themselves on one condition--we do not mention the place where we met or the names of any of the people.

"You call us engineers of territorial defense. We are in every opstina. We prepare ourselves to be a reception committee for a landing by an enemy, and we would fight when the aggressor had temporarily occupied our territory. We would turn our territory into an occupied fortress for the enemy. For that very reason we count on the fact that when he first enters the country he will give chase to us. And what should we do now for him, offer a list of our names on a silver platter? Let them make a fuss over this, maybe we'll leave a fingerprint...."

The officer of the unit admits that his people passed through an additional recruitment process. They were chosen according to moral fitness, condition, and psychological stability; in addition people from diverse professions are taken.

I had a good friend who had a great desire to do this work, and trained to carry a load of explosives on his back day and night over hills and through ravines....But when we placed a mine, his palms would perspire. He could not control his trembling. We had to take leave of him in a friendly manner. It was difficult for me to have to say to him "You know why this work is not for you!"

The officer with whom we are conversing is an experienced reserve officer of the engineers, and he has passed advanced supplemental courses as well.

During the first course in his field of specialization--which had already been 10 years--it was not his lot to have the instructor demonstrate the equipment only on his table: "For the sapper, the most important thing, besides his mind, is to have sensitive fingers. It is most important to feel how a device mechanism turns, whether the spring should be tighter or looser. And you must feel this yourself." After his remarks, the barriers between the instructor's table and the lecture hall were eliminated.

At the end of this type of training, the organizer would usually give a questionnaire to the students. Those less practiced would be reprimanded for "lack of proficiency with equipment" in the instructional laboratory. Only then would they realize that here training was carried out according to the principle: do it yourself! The essence is to develop the ability for improvisation. That is best which is constructed of almost nothing and can still function as a combative device. They are taught according to the experimental rule: "Your main warehouse will be the enemy. You will take from him and then give it back."

The technical literature tells of new explosives with terrible destructive power. The classic trotyl makes a modest impression in comparison with them, as once gunpowder did in comparison with it. The high destructive power of the new explosives means that with even very small quantities of such substances, one can achieve as much as with a greater quantity of trotyl in the old days.

Not to mention the new types of detonators: mines can be activated today by a laser beam or radio signal from a great distance, almost anytime after installation. All this increases the prospects of the sapper as destruction, losses, and chaos because at the most susceptible points of the enemy, and, what is even worse, that cursed feeling can be provoked that death is concealed and lies in wait at every step.

At one time, saboteurs could only count on mechanical detonators, and later electrical. Today they have at their disposal chemical, magnetic, laser, inertial, and even those which react only to a certain sound, to warmth, light, or odors. To go into a description of these technical devices is to risk being taken for a writer of some SF text.

However, our hosts also train persistently at the other end of the spectrum of professional skill: how to create a weapon from practically nothing, from something which can be found in every household, in the village market, or, what would be almost a luxury, in the drugstore. One of the subjects of this report zealously assured us of this:

"What do you think a mine is? A metal case which is buried in a road to blow up a tank? Or a sharp, metal, pear-shaped object which flies up from behind a bush and cuts up everything around it with fragments? Do you think that mines are only readymade traps which come from a weapons factory? Then you are mistaken. Anything can become a mine: place a small load of explosives in a pot, a bed, in a fascicle with the sign 'Strictly confidential!!--there you have a mine. Remove the cement pipe from a gutter alongside a road, stuff in a chunk of explosive, and then see how that little devil blows up everything around it.

If we do it right, we don't even need an explosive. You've seen what sort of trouble is made by an explosion of a normal bottle of gas. We figured out that you can have a destructive force of up to 3 kilograms of trotyl. A typical flashlight, a can of oil, an agitator, some fish netting--all of this in the hands of an experienced sapper can be turned into a mine."

Had it not been for Lazo Zlonoga, the self-taught master in the first partisan workshop of Banija, who made gunpowder for the church cannon which the rebel bases used, our men today could not learn this skill, which requires only salt-peter, charcoal, and sulphur. It is similar to mixing up a "Molotov cocktail," an inflammable liquid which can set a tank on fire. Many such simple skills, suitable for "home construction" in the event of war, will guarantee that our sapper will never be without a weapon.

"I never try to convince my men by power and authority," says our collocutor, trying to describe the internal relations in the unit. "I try to interest them to use their heads to solve a problem. Our job is not easy: we spend the night in the bushes and in the cold. When the sun burns you up you lie near water, but your lips do not dare touch it so as not to reveal yourself. But I feel that the harder the task, the greater the will of those who do it."

One of the men says that he had grown fond of this unit because the officer in it did not know the command "Advance!" but only "Follow me!"

In their work, we were assured, it is important to understand the enemy, to figure out where he expects attack and to prepare a trap. "You must find out all you can, and not strike for naught." Without this knowledge there can be no tricks nor a completed assignment. One must guess the intentions of the enemy, deceive him, and lead him out onto the thin ice. This unit learns how to do these things in exercises also.

"It is essential not only to complete an assignment, but also to guarantee the safety of our people after it is finished. If our unit were to disappear after several combat assignments, that would be very bad. We do not move in large groups, whose movement is too difficult to disguise. But when the group is small, we can disappear in a hurry. The trails on which we disappear "like a swallow's tail" the pursuer can expect rigged mines for a surprise, bullets from muffled weapons with little visible fire, and their tracking dogs can expect odors which will incapacitate their sense of smell for hours....."

The members of this territorial defense unit, as they themselves will say are for the most part mostly men of the field who know every path and spring, every forest and cabin for 10 kilometers around. They don't need detailed military maps to figure out how far they need to go to a certain target area, nor do they need any more conditioning to arrive at the goal from their bases. There are drivers, locksmiths, engineers, electricians, tradesmen, passionate hunters, and trained fighters (their trainer has a black belt) among them.

The group we visited during preparations did not present a textbook image of a combat unit, if by this we mean the sharp commands and clicking heels. I am

not entirely sure whether all buttons and straps were always fastened and pulled in in proper military fashion. I was impressed by something else: not one of these soldiers, who were, after all, no longer in their youth, displayed any trace of fatigue after a field reconnaissance mission performed shortly before. For this assignment they ran 20 km cross country over difficult terrain in 2 hours to collect data on the most likely objects of attack, and to choose a trail by which, under the cover of darkness, they would sneak up on their target. Their behavior revealed self-confidence and skill usually seen in experienced hunters, scouts, or mountaineers.

The day before, we had talked about the concealment and transfer of sapper's weaponry in temporarily occupied territory. Into the rules (if this is, in general, the right word) of this type of skill have been interwoven the rich experiences of our underground fighters, as well as those of other wars of liberation and revolutions throughout the world. The aggressor continually develops new technology--radar and infra-red systems of alarm against guerrillas, a network of sensors, detectors, stethoscopes, x-ray equipment, and other instruments for discovering their secret shelters, their movements and technology.

Our hosts assure us that only the brave and resourceful, and above all, the motivated man will come out the victor from such a fight. In a well, in a hair-do, a glass of yogurt, a crypt, a child's carriage, in garbage, a basket of cabbage, one can conceal a warehouse of sapper equipment. The list of such hiding places is not meant to be a recipe but only a stimulus in the creative discovery of better and more secure solutions to the problem.

With the necessary tools and weaponry in their hands and dressed in camouflage clothes, the sappers skillfully sneak through the night to the object of attack. For a moment it seems there might be a problem in their mission; before them unexpectedly lies a deep channel. About a minute later, a sufficiently strong tree trunk is felled over the water and the movement continues. Crawling, they cross a country road as quietly as a mouse, and a rather steep wall of a bridge support, they climb together, silently, with one jump.

However, a meeting with the enemy would in reality, be somewhat different. In the exercise, of course, they do not demonstrate the traditional skill of knife throwing. Finally, the sound of a firecracker on the structure of the bridge signals the end of the exercise for these exceptionally able and resourceful young men, who, on paper, quite undeservingly, remain "people without faces."

9548

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JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE TOUCHES SERBIA'S YOUTH FEDERATION

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1616, 20 Dec 81 p 32

[Article by Teodor Andjelic: "When the Leadership Gets Divided Up"]

[Text] Since the delegates of the Vojvodina Opstinas became the Vojvodina Province delegation to the Republic Conference a year ago, it became a point of dispute whether the Association of Socialist Youth of Serbia is a federation of two province youth associations and one Serbia-proper youth association and whether the Vojvodina action is causing unity to be shattered.

The quick comeback of the Vojvodina delegate, Milan Zlatar, at the meeting of the Republic Conference of the Association of Socialist Youth of Serbia "touched down" because of a short paragraph in an otherwise ordinary lengthy report on the work of this organization for 1981.

These seven stylistically and politically slapdash lines from the report literally look like this: "The most extreme expression of nationalism was experienced in the irrenditist attacks and counterrevolutionary events in Kosovo. Recognizing the state of relations in the Association of Socialist Youth of Serbia and the problems that have arisen from the socioeconomic condition and the counterrevolutionary activities of the enemy in Kosovo, the PK [Province Committee(?)] of the Association of Socialist Youth of Serbia has also pointed out several times the problems in the creation of cooperation and unity with the Association of Socialist Youth of Kosovo and the Association of Socialist Youth of the Vojvodina."

The Vojvodina: 'An Acceptable Equating'

The gist of Milan Zlatar's polemical comeback reads "the equating of the Youth Association of Vojvodina and the Youth Association of Kosovo in this infamous paragraph is unacceptable."

GLAS OMLADINE, the newspaper of the Youth Association of Vojvodina, also put "unacceptable equating" in the headline of its text about this dispute.

As for the dialogue that resulted from these infamous seven lines, apparently the most significant rejoinder to the annual report will be what Radislav Plamenic, the delegate from Barajevo, said: "We're just plain scared to tell the real

truth, to keep things from going too far....I am unable to understand the fact that our leaders, who have proven themselves in youth work, are going wrong here too. After election to leadership positions, instead of teaching with activeness and creativity, they are drowning in the tedium of politicalization and are losing the progressive ideas, which they had had; i.e., they are enacting them inconsistently, afraid that they might go deeper into the gist of the problem. This inconsistency is reflected by the frequently inaccurate presentation of the true situation and the action capability in the basic organizations."

Radislav Flamenic, however, did not speak about the "republicanization" of parts of the Association of Socialist Youth of Serbia or about its actual work. However, the polemic that follows can be regarded as "sub rosa" for the greater part of the membership of the youth organization. It also has its own history, which can be summed up into one apparently small statutory change, which Vojvodina made: Instead of sending delegates from all the opstinas (56) to the Republic Conference, it has formed its own special united delegation of 50 members.

This happened last year. A Vojvodina delegate states that the Republic Conference was informed about this ahead of time in writing.

However, the Vojvodina action is in conflict with the statute of the Association of Socialist Youth of Serbia. The Republic Conference to a certain extent has been organized "illegally."

"It is a one-sided decision," retorted Aleksandar Denda, member of the Presidium of the Republic Conference, to Milan Zlutar.

"The method of new organization in the Association of Socialist Youth of Vojvodina, with respect to the constitution of its delegation to the Republic Conference, brings unity into question in the Association of Socialist Youth of Serbia," stated Aleksandar Denda. "If the youth organization of Kosovo were to form its own delegation, then we would arrive at a position where the Republic Conference of the Association of Socialist Youth turns out to be a federation of province organizations of youth and an association of socialist youth from Serbia proper, which is unthinkable."

The Superiors and the Subordinates

The Vojvodina GLAS MLADIH did not publish the statement of Aleksandar Denda. But it carried more than that controversial paragraph; the entire controversial part of the annual report, which Milan Zlutar challenged line by line, was published. His key idea looked like this: "The relations between the Association of Socialist Youth of Vojvodina and the Association of Socialist Youth of Serbia must be in line with our democratic system, based on mutual interests along with respect for the interest of the center, and must never contain any kinds of superior and subordinate forms and uncrystallized, vague biases."

Aleksandar Denda made the following rejoinder to this: "The question of superior and subordinate forms is a question that we have to solve in our heads. The question of mutual work in the Association of Socialist Youth can only be expressed in joint agreement and in work of forms and bodies. We must not make

decisions on one side for mutual work of forms and bodies and, when meetings of such and such bodies take place, then have only the presence of delegates from the territory of Serbia, without the territory of the provinces."

Since the foundation of the Vojvodina delegation, the delegates from the province do not appear at meetings of the commissions of the Republic Conference. Likewise, the youth organization of Vojvodina no longer participates in the financing of joint activities of the Republic Conference; the Vojvodina people only pay for the personal income of their representative.

The youth organization of Kosovo has not touched the subject of changing the method of organizing the Republic Conference of Serbia or the subject of organizing its delegation in it. It has been decided that it is necessary to "open discussion" about it, just before the Congress of Socialist Youth of Serbia. Then this congress will come up with clear views on the entire dispute. The annual report on work has been "accepted fundamentally," but it has been decided that all the remarks have to be included in its text later.

The new president of the Association of Youth of Serbia, Milan Obucina, a teacher from Svetozarevo who was elected at this same conference, came out with what might be a true statement: "There is no dispute within the Association of Socialist Youth of Serbia. These are clashes among the leaders."

9625

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ALBANIAN STUDENTS GIVEN MILD SENTENCES IN ZADAR

Complaints Against Accused

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 28 Jan 82 p 4

[Text] In the Yugoslav city of Zadar on the Adriatic the trial of three young Albanians from the southern Serbian province of Kosovo opened on Monday morning. They are accused of belonging to an "illegal" organization which has its headquarters in Albania. This organization, the "Red Popular Front," is allegedly planning to separate the province--the majority of whose inhabitants are Albanian --from the Yugoslav state and annex it to Albania. The charge is based on sections 116 and 136, which deal with the most serious political crimes, such as "conspiracy" and "counterrevolution." The trial is being held in Zadar because all three were performing their military service in Dalmatia and are alleged to have committed the crime during this period. It is the first trial of Albanian "nationalists" to take place in public.

Adem Cekaj, Muhamet Bitic and Fadil Bufaj are students between 21 and 22 years of age. The first is accused of having been the organizer of the illegal group and of having recruited the other two. According to the prosecution charge, participation in the organization was pledged with "Bessa," a traditional Albanian oath. Adem Cekaj was brought from detention in Zadar, while the other two were at liberty and came from Kosovo.

The three accused plead not guilty before the court to the charge. After the charge is read, which is not based on any acts by the group but on conversations and letters between the accused, Gekaj is allowed to speak. Of the three, he makes by far the most intelligent and confident impression. Point by point he emphatically rejects the charge as untrue. He said that he had not entered the army with the intention of forming the group, he entertained no dreams of annexing Kosovo to Albania and the statements of the others, which implicated him so seriously, were lies. He stated that he knew nothing of a "Red Popular Front" and had heard of it for the first time during interrogation before the military court. The court had attempted to force a confession from him using threats and mistreatment. He speaks about it intensely, without any hint of the outbursts of aggression or hatred that are customary in Western terrorist trials.

At the end of this extremely long day in court, there is a confrontation with the second accused, in which Cekaj is brilliantly successful in exposing the frequently contradictory statements of his former friend and making them appear extraordinarily unbelievable. He and his defense lawyer, Dr Milan Vladovic, are able to create the impression that a confession, the details of which do not seem to be easily recollected, was also extorted from Bitic, without this suspicion ever being expressed in words.

It is interesting that Cekaj comes from an Albanian "partisan family." His father was with Tito's partisans in 1941, two of his brothers and an uncle are respected party members, while he himself as a schoolboy was permitted four times to carry the "Youth Baton" in his home village, as was customary during Tito's life. High ranking party functionaries visited his parents' home from Belgrade just a few years ago. The trial is expected to last 3 days.

Weak Case for Prosecution

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 3 Feb 82 p 4

[Text] Mercy for the Kosovo Albanians

The trial of three young Albanians from Kosovo in the Croatian city of Zadar on the Adriatic, the opening of which was reported in these columns recently, was instructive for the observer in many respects. This was the first opportunity to follow the trial of Kosovos Albanians, following the barring of journalists from the proceedings in connection with the bloody riots in the spring of 1981 in the autonomous southern Serbian province, when the public was informed only of the main points of the charges and of the generally severe sentences.

The Prosecution on Shaky Ground

As was reported, the prosecution accused Adem Cefaj, a 21-year old medical student, of having formed an "illegal" group during his military service, which was alleged to have maintained contact with a so-called red Popular Front in Albania. There was no proof of such contact. The two others accused, 22-year old Muhat Biticij and 21-year old Fadil Bufaj, were the other alleged "members" of the group. Since they "confessed" at the very beginning, they were also acting as witnesses for the prosecution. Unlike Cefaj, they had not been kept in detention. But their statements were so confused that they contributed little to supporting the prosecution's arguments, but rather to the image of innocuousness that characterized the entire case. This impression was strengthened by the statements of four other witnesses--friends of Adem Cefaj--which were supposed to confirm that Cefaj committed seditious statements to paper in allegorical formulations in letters to them in the previous year. Even this incriminating evidence was unconvincing. The texts read out reflected the image of an idealistic-romantic young man.

The accused and the witnesses had first been examined by an army court of inquiry, since they were draftees. With the exception of the principal accused they made similar statements that confessions or incriminating statements had been forced from them ("the major held the pistol against my throat with the safety

off") or that confessions had been dictated or suggested to them. Adem Cefaj also reported massive physical pressure applied during his 16-day detention by the army.

The state prosecutor placed great importance on receiving confirmation that Cefaj had expressed his love of Albania, "Albania is better than Yugoslavia." Neither those accused with him nor witnesses were able to confirm anything more damaging than that he stated there was no unemployment in Albania, no social inequity and no vendetta. To what extent the fact that in Kosovo young people, particularly university graduates, experience great difficulty in finding a job, unemployment is extremely high there, the vendetta still cannot be suppressed completely, although it is naturally illegal, and the discrepancy with the rest of Yugoslavia in the standard of living is undeniable, to what extent all this nourishes romantic ideas of the neighboring "motherland" is hard to judge as a whole, but it is highly likely.

Such feelings could also be fed by the doubts that constantly surfaced during the trial whether the Albanians in Yugoslavia really enjoy all the rights granted to them in the constitution. The experience of military service seems to reinforce such doubts for young people from Kosovo. In spite of all the theories and official assurances, they are, as all the accused stated to the court, particularly exposed to deceit and discrimination in this "melting pot" of nations and peoples.

The Economic Environment

It is part of the most interesting elements of the trial in Zadar that the defense attorneys, through their questions, helped to clarify the economic conditions of life of the accused. The occasionally precarious economic situation of the families of the accused was taken into account by the court in determining punishment. The sentence, 1 year and 8 months imprisonment for Cefaj, 8 months with 3 years probation for the other two, is "mild" compared with the sentences passed on demonstrators last year by courts in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. In these instances, university and high school students were given sentences of up to 15 years in prison for offenses which were roughly on a level with those with which the accused in Zadar were charged.

The inhabitants of Zadar showed very little interest in this public trial. In contrast to political trials in the Croatian capital of Zagreb, where massive security measures had been taken inside and outside the court building, there was nothing like this to be seen in Zadar. The atmosphere of this trial, which was conducted with particular fairness to the accused, was normal, even humane.

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